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FROM HEARSAY TO ETERNITY: PENDENCY
AND THE CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION IN
CALIFORNIA-FACT, FICTION, AND A NOVEL
APPROACH
John Bilyeu Oakley*
Twice in three years the Supreme Court of California has
struggled to define the concept of the "pendency" of a conspiracy for the purpose of applying the "co-conspirator exception"
to the hearsay rule.' For reasons which lie at the very roots of
the co-conspirator exception and its incestuous kin, the substantive law of conspiracy, these efforts have been unsuccessful. The formulation of a workable standard for determining
the pendency of a conspiracy in an evidentiary context requires
more, however, than a mere return to the status quo ante of
three years ago. Rather, it requires recognition that for well
over 100 years California law, in keeping with the common law
of evidence in the United States generally, has misperceived
the crucial differences between the substantive law which governs the consequences flowing from a finding of fact that an
individual was party to a conspiracy, and the evidentiary law
which governs the proof by which the trier of fact may be persuaded to make so grave a finding. This article offers a comparative analysis of the theories and purposes of the two species
of conspiracy law, substantive and evidentiary, as well as an
explication of the co-conspirator exception as it has evolved
under California law. The purpose of the article is not only to
stimulate revision of the supreme court's recent brace of pendency cases, but also to suggest a rational and workable basis
for the consistent adjudication of future questions concerning
the co-conspirator exception and the pendency of conspiracies.
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; B.A., 1969, University
of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1972, Yale University; Member, California Bar.
1. People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 541 P.2d 296, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1975); People
v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 500 P.2d 610, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1972). If the existence of a
conspiracy can be established by independent evidence, California's "co-conspirator

exception" to the hearsay rule permits evidence of statements made by one conspirator
to be admitted against a co-conspirator, provided that the statements were made in
furtherance of the conspiracy and before its termination-that is, while the conspiracy
was pending. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1223 (West 1966), set out at note 9 infra.
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SUMMARY OF RECENT SUPREME COURT PENDENCY CASES

The currently contorted posture of pendency law in California is attributable to two supreme court cases involving
murder-for-hire conspiracies. In the 1972 case of People v.
Saling,2 the defendant had conspired with Murphy3 to murder
Murphy's wife. The principal witness for the prosecution was
Carnes, a co-conspirator who had not been present at the scene
of the murder. To prove that the conspiracy had in fact resulted
in the contemplated murder, and that the defendant had physically participated in the murder, the prosecution sought to
introduce hearsay evidence, defined by the Evidence Code as
"evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove
the truth of the matter stated."4 Such evidence is inadmissible
"[ejxcept as provided by law." 5 The hearsay at issue in Saling
consisted of two declarations describing the details of the murder, both of which were made by co-conspirators of the defendant after the murder had occurred. First, Carnes testified to
the content of the declaration made to him three days after the
murder by Jurgenson, a fourth conspirator who, together with
Murphy and the defendant, had actually committed the murder. Second, the prosecution introduced tape recordings of two
conversations between Murphy and Carnes which had taken
place three weeks after the murder.7
The supreme court ruled in Saling that the evidence of the
declaration made three days after the murder was admissible8
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1223, California's codification of the co-conspirator exception;' evidence of the declara2. 7 Cal. 3d 844, 500 P.2d 610, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1972).
3. See People v. Murphy, 8 Cal. 349, 503 P.2d 594, 105 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1972).
4. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a) (West 1966).
5. Id. (b). Where appropriate, this article refers to "hearsay" less formally to
connote an extrajudicial statement itself, rather than evidence thereof offered in court.
6. People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 849, 500 P.2d 610, 613, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698, 701
(1972).
7. Id. at 848, 500 P.2d at 612, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
8. Id. at 852-53, 500 P.2d at 615, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
9. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1223 (West 1966) provides:
Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule if:
(a) The statement was made by the declarant while participating in a
conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the
objective of that conspiracy;
(b) The statement was made prior to or during the time that the party
was participating in that conspiracy; and

(c) The evidence is offered either after admission of evidence sufficient
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tions made three weeks after the murder, however, was not
within the scope of the co-conspirator exception and hence had
been erroneously admitted.'" Since there was a reasonable
probability that the inadmissible evidence had been prejudicial, the judgment of conviction was reversed."
The crucial distinction between the admissible and the
inadmissible evidence was that approximately two weeks after
the murder Murphy had completed payment of the remuneration which he had promised to Carnes and the defendant." The
court held that the "trier of fact"-here presumably the trial
court operating under Evidence Code section 403-could permissibly find that the conspiracy was still pendent three days
after the murder because the payment of compensation to the
hired conspirators had yet to be effected:
It has long been the law in this state that a conspirator's
statements are admissible against his coconspirator only
when made during the conspiracy and in furtherance
thereof. The conspiracy usually comes to an end when the
substantive crime for which the coconspirators are being
tried is either attained or defeated. It is for the trier of
fact-considering the unique circumstances and the nature and purpose of the conspiracy in each case-to determine precisely when the conspiracy has ended. Particular
circumstances may well disclose a situation where the conspiracy will be deemed to have extended beyond the substantive crime to activities contemplated and undertaken
by the conspirators in pursuance of the objectives of the
conspiracy.'"
to sustain a finding of the facts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or,
in the court's discretion as to the order of proof, subject to the admission
of such evidence.
10. 7 Cal. 3d at 853, 500 P.2d at 616, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
11. Id. at 856, 500 P.2d at 618, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 706. Saling was subsequently
retried and again convicted. This time the judgment was affirmed on appeal in an
unpublished opinion, People v. Saling, 2 Crim. No. 24226 (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 3,1974),
and a petition for hearing by the supreme court was denied January 29, 1975.
12. In Saling itself there is no indication given as to when payment was effected,
other than the statements quoted at text accompanying notes 14-15 infra, that payment occurred after Jurgenson's declaration to Carnes and before Murphy's taperecorded conversation with Carnes. There is a lengthy restatement of the facts of
Saling in People v. Leach, however, which facts the court noted were "drawn from
both our opinion in [Saling] and a fresh review of the record therein." People v.
Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 429 n.8, 541 P.2d 296, 302 n.8, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752, 758 n.8 (1975).
It is in Leach that the court states that payment in Saling occurred "[a] fortnight or
so after Jurgenson's narration." Id. at 430, 541 P.2d at 302-03, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 75859.
13. 7 Cal. 3d at 852, 500 P.2d at 615, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 703 (citations omitted).
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Since the money Murphy had offered for the murder of his wife
not only "motivated the defendant and Jerry Carnes to participate in the plan" but was "one of its main objectives as far as
defendant and Carnes were concerned," and since neither Saling nor Carnes had received payment at the time Jurgenson
spoke to Carnes three days after the murder, the court concluded that "Jurgenson's statements to Carnes were admissible
as being made during the conspiracy."' 4 The recordings of the
Murphy-Carnes conversation, however,
were clearly made not only after Catherine Murphy had
been killed but also after payment had been made to defendant and Jerry Carnes. It does not appear that the
statements were otherwise made during any activity in
pursuance of any significant objective of the conspiracy. 5
As Mr. Justice Sullivan was at pains to point out in his
solitary dissent to Saling, "[A]ccording to the logic of the
majority . . . a conspiracy might last forever."'" The operative
premise of this logic is that the "objectives" of a conspiracy
include the individual interests of hired participants in obtaining the promised remuneration which motivated their participation in the conspiracy. When such promises are repudiated
outright by the promisor or otherwise remain unfulfilled to the
satisfaction of the promisee, there arises under the "logic of the
majority" the spectre of an endless conspiracy, a legal fiction
in which a conspiracy long dissipated in reality is treated as
without end for evidentiary purposes. Thus it seemed after
Saling that a conspiracy might in legal contemplation be
deemed to be "continuing" for so long as any hired participant
personally-even unilaterally-felt entitled to receive additional compensation for his conspiratorial activities.
People v. Leach, 7 the first case before the supreme court
in which the Saling rule has come home to roost, demonstrated
that Mr. Justice Sullivan's evidentiarily endless conspiracy is
no mere chimera. Leach, like Saling, involved a murder-forhire conspiracy in which evidence of the post-murder hearsay
declarations of a conspirator had been admitted at the trial of
a co-conspirator. In Leach, however, the hired killer had been
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 853,
Id. at 853,
Id. at 858,
15 Cal. 3d

500 P.2d at 615, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
500 P.2d at 616, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
500 P.2d at 619, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 707 (dissenting opinion).
419, 541 P.2d 296, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1975).
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apprehended shortly after the murder. 8 The instigators of the
crime were the wife and daughter of the victim, Kramer. They
had promised their triggerman a post-mortem payment, 9 but
following his arrest cared only to avoid implicating themselves
in the crime. The hireling, Leach, was thus abandoned to his
fate at the hands of the authorities, "left, in the timeless fashion of forsaken former conspirators, to 'twist slowly, slowly in
the wind.''"20
Once he realized which way the wind was blowing, Leach
was less than content with his lot. Over a period of several
months, beginning about half a year after the murder,2 ' Leach
confided the details of the murder to a jailhouse trustee, Hagler. Leach hoped Hagler, who was soon to be released, would
agree to pressure the Kramer women into paying Hagler what
was owed to Leach, with Hagler then to use at least part of the
funds for Leach's benefit by funneling the money to a relative,
retaining counsel, or arranging an escape.2"
Hagler instead reported Leach's admissions and aspirations to the jail officials. 3 Relayed to the officers who had investigated the Kramer murder, Leach's admissions confirmed
existing suspicions that Leach had been party to a murder-forhire conspiracy." One of the officers subsequently approached
the Kramer women in the guise of a jailhouse friend of Leach,
and by demanding that they arrange for legal counsel for Leach
or suffer exposure by Leach, induced the women to make a
series of highly incriminatory tape recorded admissions."
Apparently in reliance upon the Saling doctrine that a
conspiracy involving a hired participant continues until that
participant's personal "objective," remuneration, is either fulfilled or abandoned, the trial court in Leach ruled that all of
the admissions by Leach and the Kramers had been during and
in furtherance of a "continuing" conspiracy, notwithstanding
that Leach's admissions came a half a year, and the Kramers'
18. Id. at 424, 541 P.2d at 299, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
19. Id. at 425, 541 P.2d at 300, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
20. Id. at 437, 541 P.2d at 308, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 764. The phrase quoted by the
supreme court was coined by former presidential adviser John Ehrlichman and came
to light during the Senate Watergate Hearings. Id. at 437 n.13, 541 P.2d at 308 n.13,
124 Cal. Rptr. at 764 n.13.
21. Id. at 425-26, 541 P.2d at 299-300, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56.
22. Id. at 425, 541 P.2d at 299, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
23. Id. at 426, 541 P.2d at 300, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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admissions some 15 months, after the commission of the sole
substantive crime contemplated by that conspiracy.26 The trial
court thus invoked the co-conspirator exception to allow each
admission to be used against each of the declarant's coconspirators.
The supreme court held that this was an erroneous application of the co-conspirator exception.27 The court's discomfort
with Saling was manifest. In response to what it termed the
"misunderstanding" of Saling by the lower courts, the court
essentially limited Saling to its facts, excising the inferential
Saling doctrine that conspiracies remain pendent until all accounts among conspirators are squared."
The court's surgeon in Leach was also the author of Saling:
Chief Justice Wright. In what was avowedly a retrospective
"explication" of Saling, he first undertook to review at length
the facts of Saling,30 going so far as to look beyond his own
opinion in the earlier case and to draw facts directly from the
record in Saling.3 ' There followed a restatement of "[t]he
Saling rule on termination of conspiracies." 3 The Chief Justice stressed that Saling had construed the applicability of
Evidence Code section 1223 (the co-conspirator exception to
the hearsay rule) as contingent not only upon the pendency of
the conspiracy at the time of the declaration, and the furtherance of the conspiracy by that declaration, 3 but also upon a
prima facie showing by independent evidence that a conspiracy
did in fact exist.34
The "narrow scope" of the Saling rule on the termination
26. The court's opinion specifies that Leach's admissions occurred from June
through October, 1971, id. at 426, 541 P.2d at 300, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 756, but states
only in passing that the Kramers' admissions were elicited fifteen months after Leach's
arrest. Id. at 437, 541 P.2d at 308, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 764. The court does state that the
last arrest in the case was made on March 14, 1972. Id. at 433, n.11, 541 P.2d at 305
n.ll, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 761 n.ll. The transcripts of the tape recordings of the Kramers'
admissions show them to have occurred on March 10-11, 1972. People's Exhibit No.
1014, People v. Leach, No. A-421988 (L.A. Super. Ct.), Leach committed the murder
early Christmas morning, 1970. 15 Cal. 3d at 424, 541 P.2d at 299, 124 Cal. Rptr. at
755.
27. 15 Cal. 3d at 438, 541 P.2d at 308, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
28. Id. at 432, 541 P.2d at 304-05, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 760-61.
29. Id. at 428, 541 P.2d at 302, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
30. Id. at 429-30, 541 P.2d at 302-03, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 758-59.
31. Id. at 429 n.8, 541 P.2d at 302 n.8, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 578 n.8. See note 12 supra.
32. Id. at 430, 541 P.2d at 303, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
33. Id. at 431, 541 P.2d at 303, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 759. See the quotations from
Saling accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
34. Id. at 430 & n.10, 541 P.2d at 303 & n.10, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 759 & n.10.
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of conspiracies was then underscored by according "special
emphasis" to two crucial aspects of Saling.3 5 First, according to
the court in Leach, "Saling did not purport to declare that all
conspiracies in which one conspirator is hired by another are
to be deemed as a matter of law to continue until the hireling
is paid to his satisfaction."3 Rather, Saling had turned on its
"'particular circumstances,' "" which included not only the
fact that "neither Carnes, the testifying witness, nor Saling,
the defendant against whom the evidence was offered, had
been paid in full at the time of Jurgenson's declaration," but
also "the facts that Murphy's offer of money had been the
motivation for the participation of both Saling and Carnes, and
that the declaration had occurred 'only three days after the

murder.'

"38

Second, the "particular circumstances" which sufficed in
Saling to establish the continuing nature of the conspiracy at
the time of Jurgenson's post-murder declaration, had been independently shown to exist by evidence apart from the content
of the declaration itself.3"
In applying the reworked Saling rule to the facts of Leach,
the court made clear that Leach's greatest gloss upon Saling
was the tying of the independent evidence requirement directly
to the pendency and furtherance requirements. The Saling
court had applied the independent evidence rule to reject the
prosecution's contention that Murphy's declaration to Carnes,
which had occurred after Carnes had received payment, had
nevertheless been made during the pendency of a purported
"insurance conspiracy."'" However, the rule had been rather
35. Id. at 432, 541 P.2d at 304, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
36. Id.
37. Id., quoting People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 852, 500 P.2d 610, 615, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 698, 703 (1972).
38. Id., quoting People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 852, 500 P.2d 610, 615, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 698, 703 (1972).
39. Id.
40. The Saling court wrote:
The People make an alternative argument . . . that the recorded
conversations were admissible as being made during a conspiracy to collect the proceeds of the insurance policies on the life of Catherine Murphy
. . . [and] contend that since such a conspiracy did not end until the
insurance proceeds were paid, the statements made by a coconspirator
prior to that time were admissible.
People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 854, 500 P.2d 610, 616, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698, 704 (1972).
Evidence adduced at trial indicated that there were insurance policies in the total
amount of $25,665 on the life of Catherine Murphy; that an uninsured motorist clause
in Murphy's automobile insurance provided $15,000 coverage for injury or death result-

8

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

routinely stated. There was only the thinnest of inferences in
Saling itself that independent evidence was required not only
of the original existence of a conspiracy to which the defendant
and the declarant were parties, but also of the continuing
pendency of that conspiracy at the time the declaration was
made. In restating Saling's acknowledgement of the independent evidence requirement, Leach comprehensively reformulated that requirement. Noting that "[tihe independent evidence requirement is set forth somewhat awkwardly in subdivision (c) of Evidence Code section 1223,"' 1 the court declared:
[T]hree preliminary facts are required to be established
under section 1223 if evidence of the declaration of a coconspirator is to be admissible: (1) that the declarant was
participating in a conspiracy at the time of the declaration; (2) that the declaration was in furtherance of the
objective of that conspiracy; and (3) that at the time of the
declaration the party against whom the evidence is offered
was participating or would later participate in the conspiracy. Section 1223 permits none of these facts to be estabing from hit-and-run; and that Murphy apparently had forged his wife's signature on
an application for one of the policies. Reiterating the rule that a prima facie showing
by independent evidence of the existence of a conspiracy is a prerequisite to admission
of evidence of a co-conspirator's declaration, the court concluded, "[T]here is nothing
in the record to indicate that defendant or the Carnes brothers were involved in a
conspiracy to collect the proceeds of the insurance policies, nor is there any evidence
from which we may infer the existence of such a conspiracy." Id. at 855, 500 P.2d at
617, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
The court went on to note that the only mention of insurance in the recorded
conversations themselves consisted of Murphy being asked about his insurance and
Murphy's observation in response that he would recover only $5000, although if he had
"wanted to use my car I'd get fifty [sic; fifteen?] grand," and that he "wasn't doing
this for insurance." Id. at n.10, 500 P.2d at n.10, 103 Cal. Rptr. at n.10. The veracity
of this assertion by Murphy is somewhat suspect. Since he misrepresented the amount
of insurance on his wife as $5000 rather than the $25,000 established at trial, he may
well have wanted the money-but without sharing it with his co-conspirators in the
murder. This raises in a different context the very problem which provoked Mr. Justice Sullivan's dissent in Saling and led to the difficulties encountered by the Leach
court in holding the co-conspirators' statements in Leach inadmissible notwithstanding Saling: the extent to which the personal motivations of a particular conspirator for
entering into a conspiracy are to be imputed to the conspiracy generally as if they were
the objectives which all the conspirators were striving in common to accomplish. See
id. at 857, 500 P.2d at 618-19, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07 (dissenting opinion). If Murphy
was motivated, at least in part, to murder his wife so as to recover insurance on her
life, but concealed this motive from his conspirators by misrepresenting the amount
of insurance in force, can the conspiracy as a whole reasonably be deemed to be
continuing for so long as it takes Murphy to collect the insurance about which his coconspirators do not know, and in which they will not share?
41. People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 430-31 n.10, 541 P.2d 296, 303 n.10, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 752, 759 n.10 (1975).

1975]

THE CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION

9

lished through the evidence of the declaration itself, save
insofar as the content of the evidence must be considered
in determining whether the declaration was in furtherance
of what is established prima facie by independent evidence
to have been the object of the conspiracy."
It was this expanded requirement of independent evidence
which proved dispositive in Leach. Despite the fact that "the
circumstances of the murder and the evidence found on Leach
at the time of his arrest were surely sufficient to make out a
prima facie showing of conspiracy," 43 the court held that
what Saling requires, and what is totally lacking in this
case, is independent evidence that the conspiracy between
Leach and the Kramers was still operative at the time of
their respective admissions, notwithstanding the accomplishment of the primary objective of the conspiracy with
the death of Howard Kramer."
Indeed, the court noted, the evidence of the admissions themselves failed to establish that the conspiracy remained in existence for more than a few weeks following Leach's incarceration.45 And even if, contrary to the evidence,4" the collection of
42. Id.
43. Id. at 443, 541 P.2d at 305, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 437 & n.12, 541 P.2d at 307-08 & n.12, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 763-64 & n.12.
46. The Leach court resoundingly denounced resort to a supposed "insurance
conspiracy" as a device for fictitiously prolonging the evidentiary life of any conspiracy
to commit an act which may result in the incidental payment of insurance to one or
more of the conspirators. Citing the Saling court's refusal to accept Murphy's beneficiary status under insurance policies on his wife's life as establishing prima facie the
existence of an "insurance conspiracy" even though Murphy had forged his victim's
signature to obtain the insurance, the court in Leach concluded:
[T]he same result must obtain when the record reflects in addition
nothing more than that the insurance in force was in due course actually
collected by the murderous beneficiary. To hold otherwise would have the
artificial effect of making virtually every interspousal murder conspiracy
a prima facie insurance conspiracy as well, since many spouses have some
sort of reciprocal life insurance in force . . . .A murderer playing the
part of a bereaved spouse is hardly likely to refuse to accept the payment
of such insurance notwithstanding that the collection of insurance proceeds may in no way have been the motive or objective of the murder
conspiracy.
. .The
T objective of the conspiracy was to kill Howard Kramer, not
to collect insurance, and Leach cared not a whit whence his renumeration
came, be it by insurance fraud, bank robbery, or dope peddling.
15 Cal. 3d at 434-35, 541 P.2d at 306, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
The court held that under such circumstances it saw "no basis for 'further breach
of the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence,' " noting in passing that
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insurance were deemed to have been a second principal objective of the conspiracy, there was no showing of when the insurance proceeds had in fact been collected. 7
The Leach gloss on Saling is best summed up by the court
itself:
[1It appears that the trial court erroneously read
Saling as holding that once there is independent evidence
that one conspirator was induced to enter the conspiracy
by a promise of payment, then as a matter of law the
conspiracy is to be deemed continuing until such time as
other evidence indicates payment has been received. Such
a presumption that conspirators who stand in an unenforceable debtor-creditor relationship are going to be motivated by a continuing common desire to make a full and
satisfactory accounting, and are going to act in concert
towards this objective in continuation of their conspiracy
to commit the crime for which payment was promised,
belies common sense and adds but another layer of tarnish
48
to the already dull finish of conspiracy doctrine.
II.

EXPLICATION OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION

Conspiracy doctrine is indeed dull, in every sense of the
word: unresponsive, sluggish, boring, cloudy, indistinct, and
sometimes simply stupid." It would be less dull if it were more
reflective: if courts would pause on occasion to consider the
"no special statutes are involved, such as those making it a crime to commit arson with
intent to defraud an insurer." Id. at 435, 541 P.2d at 306, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 762. The
court-notwithstanding its attempt to reconcile Leach with Saling-emphasized its
commitment to curtailing use of the co-conspirator exception to admit evidence of

statements made after the substantive criminal objective of a conspiracy has been
achieved or abandoned:
We . . . decline to treat a conspiracy to commit a particular criminal
offense as necessarily entailing a second conspiracy to collect the insurance proceeds which will be paid as a matter of course upon the successful
commission of the contemplated offense. "[Tihe looseness and pliability

of the doctrine [of conspiracy] present inherent dangers which should
be in the background of judicial thought wherever it is sought to extend
the doctrine to meet the exigencies of a particular case."
Id. at 435, 541 P.2d at 307, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 763. The court's concluding quotation is
from Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 449 (1949).
47. People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 435-36, 541 P.2d 296, 307, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752,
763 (1975).
48. Id. at 436, 541 P.2d at 307, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
49. See the definition of the adjective "dull" in AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 403 (W. Morris ed. 1969), and the accompanying comment:
Figuratively, dull implies lack of
"Dull implies loss of sharpness through use ....
intelligence or slowness of perception .

...

"
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origins and evolution of a doctrine which has grown like Topsy
to overshadow the criminal law. Time is, of course, a luxury in
the hurly-burly judicial world of crowded trial dockets and virtually automatic appeals. Thus this article proposes to add
some polish to the "dull finish of conspiracy doctrine," and, at
least with respect to the co-conspirator exception, remove
enough tarnish for the courts to see in the reflections of future
cases a clearer image of the logic and the limits of the coconspirator exception.
The exception is principally used by the state in criminal
prosecutions, as part of the process whereby the state seeks to
establish that a particular individual has forfeited his or her
right to personal liberty. Even though every arguable misapplication of the co-conspirator exception may not assume the
magnitude of federal constitutional error,5 0 liberty is still at
stake. There is thus special relevance in the call to order of Mr.
Justice Cardozo:
In delimiting the field of liberty, courts have professed
for the most part to go about their work empirically and
have rather prided themselves on doing so. They have said,
we will not define due process of law. We will leave it to
be "pricked out" by a process of inclusion and exclusion
in individual cases. That was to play safely, and very likely
at the beginning to play wisely. The question is how long
we are to be satisfied with a series of ad hoc conclusions.
It is all very well to go on pricking the lines, but the time
must come when we shall do prudently to look them over,
and see whether they make a pattern or a medley of scraps
and patches."
A.

Rationale for the Substantive Law of Conspiracy

The rationale for treating the act of conspiring itself as a
crime independent of the substantive crimes contemplated by
the conspirators is the principle that "collective action toward
an antisocial end involves a greater risk to society than individual action toward the same end." 52
Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the
50. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). See generally text accompanying
notes 182-183 infra.
51. B. CARDOZO, The Paradoxesof Legal Science, in SELEcTr WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CAaDOzo 310-11 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
52. Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 92324 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; see Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.
770, 777-79 & n.10 (1975).

12

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases
the probability that the individuals involved will depart
from their path of criminality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the
attainment of ends more complex than those which one
criminal could accomplish . . .[and] makes more likely

the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose
for which the group was formed. 3
It follows that "the agreement is the essential evil at which
the crime of conspiracy is directed." 54 In an effort to create a
measure of deterrence against such agreements over and above
whatever deterrent effect may be attributable to the general
criminal law's prohibition of the substantive crimes contemplated,55 and in recognition of the probative difficulties posed
by organized crime in a technological society,56 courts have
invoked agency theories of the civil law to impose nearly absolute vicarious responsibility for the acts of co-conspirators.57
B.

Genesis of the Co-ConspiratorException
Like the proverbial chicken and the egg of which she seems
at once both product and progenitrix, the imposition of vicarious liability for the substantive acts of co-conspirators is historically so closely associated with the fostering of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule that it cannot clearly
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961).
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975).
Developments, supra note 52, at 922, 925.
Id. at 999.
See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); 1 B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 121-25 (1963); Developments, supra note 52, at 993-1000.
Although the substantive liability of a conspirator for the acts of co-conspirators
is subject to "pendency" and "furtherance" requirements nominally identical to those
discussed at length in the context of the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule,
see text accompanying notes 95-112 infra, these requirements have been applied with
extreme laxity. Generally, they have been subsumed under vague notions of the
"scope" of a conspiracy and the forseeable consequences of joining a conspiracy.
Thus,
the United States Supreme Court has held that a co-conspirator may escape vicarious
responsibility
if the substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators was not
in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope
of the unlawful project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the
plan which could not be reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural
consequence of the unlawful agreement.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946). As Mr. Witkin has noted with
his customary incisiveness: "Despite the repeated affirmation of this accepted principle, cases actually holding that an act was outside the scope of the conspiracy are
scarce." 1 B. WrrKIN, supra § 122.
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be established which concept hatched the other. That the hearsay exception embodies the same agency concepts as the rule
of vicarious liability for the substantive crimes of coconspirators is manifest from the traditional elements of the
exception:
[Tihe prosecution in a conspiracy case is permitted to
introduce out-of-court statements prejudicial to the defendant as long as they were made by alleged co-conspirators
of the defendant and three prerequisites are met: the statements must have been made during the course, or
pendency, of the alleged conspiracy; they must have been
made in furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives; and
they must be buttressed at trial by independent evidence
of both the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's
participation in it. 5
These three prerequisites all have their analogies not only
in the substantive law of criminal conspiracy but also in civil
agency law.59 Moreover, the co-conspirator exception as an accepted feature of American law is generally traced to United
States v. Gooding,"° a criminal case in which the substantive
law of civil agency and its evidentiary correlates were specifically invoked."
C.

Substantive Agency Theory and the Evidentiary Agency
Rationale for the Co-ConspiratorException

Unfortunately for reasoned jurisprudence, the agency relationship between defendant and co-conspirator which was
fairly inferable as fact in Gooding has been entirely fictitious
in most subsequent applications of the co-conspirator excep58. Davenport, The ConfrontationClause and the Co-ConspiratorException in
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1378, 1385 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator
Exception].
59. Garland & Snow, The Co-ConspiratorsException to the HearsayRule: Procedural Implementation and ConfrontationClause Requirements, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 1, 3, 4-5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Garland & Snow, The Co-ConspiratorException to the Hearsay Rule]; Developments, supra note 52, at 988-89 & n.526.
60. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827).
61. The Gooding case involved criminal prosecution of the owner of the slave ship
General Winder. The challenged hearsay had been introduced in the form of evidence
given by one Coit, who testified that he had been solicited to serve as mate aboard
the General Winder on a slaving expedition. Coit had been assured by the captain that
the defendant Gooding would see to it that Coit was paid "in the event of a disaster
attending the voyage." Gooding v. United States, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 468 (1827).
In upholding the admissibility of this evidence, the Court was none too fastidious

14

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

tion. 2 Gooding involved a business venture which was every bit
as commercial as it was illicit, and which was accordingly organized and operated along conventional business lines. As a
result, the conspirators shared a classic civil agency relationship. 3 Especially in view of the authoritarian master-servant
about segregating the substantive and the evidentiary aspects of its ruling. The Court
began by rejecting the contention that "the doctrine of the binding effect of such declarations by known agents is, and ought to be, confined to civil cases." Id. The Court
invoked the principle that "[i]n general, the rules of evidence in criminal and civil
cases are the same." Id. But in the very same breath, the Court went on to draw
analogies between the civil and the criminal law in the substantive area of vicarious
liability, comparing the civil rule that "[w]hatever the agent does, within the scope
of his authority, binds his principal, and is deemed his act," id., with the vicarious
liability imposed under the criminal law upon one "who commands, or procures a
crime to be done," and "in cases of conspiracy and riot." Id. at 469. Finally, the Court
issued its seminal ruling in terms which suggest that the substantive aspects of the
declarations in question, as verbal acts themselves part of the offense of slave-trading,
were an essential element of their admissibility:
The evidence here offered was not the mere declarations of the master
. . .totally disconnected with the objects of the voyage. These declarations were connected with acts in furtherance of the objects of the voyage,
and within the general scope of his authority as conductor of the enterprise. . . [His declarations] were, therefore, in the strictest sense, a
part of the res gestae, the necessary explanations attending the attempt
to hire . . .[and] as much within the scope of the authority, as the act
of hiring itself. Our opinion of the admissibility of this evidence proceeds
upon the ground, that these were not the naked declarations of the master, unaccompanied with his acts in that capacity, but declarations coupled with proceedings for the objects of the voyage, and while it was in
progress. We give no opinion upon the point, whether mere declarations,
under other circumstances, would have been admissible. The principle
which we maintain is stated with great clearness by Mr. Starkie, in his
Treatise on Evidence (2 Stark. Evid. part 4, p. 60): "Where," says he,
"the fact of agency has been proved, either expressly or presumptively,
the act of the agent, co-extensive with the authority, is the act of the
principal, whose mere instrument he is, and then, whatever the agent
says, within the scope of his authority, the principal says, and evidence
may be given of such acts and declarations, as if they had been actually
done and made by the principal himself."
Id. at 469-70; cf. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator
Exception, supra note 58, at 1406 & n.100.
62. See FED. R. Ev. 801(d)(2)(E), Advisory Comm. Note at 330 (C. Boardman
ed. 1973).
63. It is ironic that were Gooding to be tried today in California, it would not be
necessary to resort to the co-conspirator exception to gain admission of the hearsay
there involved. The facts of Gooding, see note 61 supra, would seem indisputably to
make the declaration an "authorized admission," admissible as such under the stricter
civil agency exception to the hearsay rule codified as Evidence Code section 1222. See
note 181 infra.
Section 1222 provides, in pertinent part, that an "authorized admission" is a
statement "made by a person authorized by the party [against whom the statement
is offered] to make a statement or statements for him concerning the subject matter
of the statement." CAL. Evm. CODE § 1222(a) (West 1966). The text of section 1222,
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precepts obtaining in the early 19th century, it was entirely
appropriate in Gooding to treat the co-conspirator cum declarant as the "mere instrument" of the defendant. As routinely
applied in modern times, however, the co-conspirator exception makes a mockery of the archetypal agent-principal relationship in which the co-conspirators are the defendants' marionettes, their every act and declaration directly instigated by
the defendants. 4
Indeed, the lines of authority which pervade a criminal
conspiracy would have to be capable of reversing field with the
celerity of electrical current if agency notions were truly to be
honored when virtually any declaration by any member of a
conspiracy is used to administer an evidentiary shock to any
other member of the conspiracy who happens to be held to
ground in a court of law.
The elastic concepts of "agency" embodied in current conspiracy law have eroded the original agency rationale for the coconspirator exception almost to the point of elimination. Indeed, the continuing invocation of agency concepts such as
pendency and furtherance in cases in which the defendant
clearly had no authority or control over the declarant suggests
that a distinction must be drawn between the agency theory for
the co-conspirator exception-that is, the substantive principles by which declarants may be held to be agents of the accused and hence within the purview of the co-conspirator exception-and the agency rationaleby which such an exception
to the hearsay rule is purportedly justified. A commentator has
made the point well:
The agency argument . . . fails because it shows no
reason for exempting conspirators' utterances from the
hearsay rule. To say that the substantive law does so only
begs the question. The rules of agency govern the substantive law of conspiracy; they decide who is a member of the
conspiracy. As such they are involved in determining
against whom the evidence may be admitted. The point is
together with the presumption that the succeeding section 1223 setting forth the coconspirator exception is not mere surplusage, establish that the admissibility of an
"authorized admission" under section 1222 must be predicated on a much more substantial showing of actual agency and authority to speak than is the case with the
admission of a co-conspirator proffered under section 1223.
64. See Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 755 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation]; Comment, The Hearsay Exception
for Co-Conspirators'Declarations, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 530, 539-40 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, The HearsayException for Co-Conspirators'Declarations].
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that they are not relevant in determining why it should be
admitted."

A second commentator, also stressing that "the exception is in
fact an evidentiary, and thus proceduralinstrument, and must
be treated as such," aptly concluded, "It is one thing to say
that because we hate all conspirators, we will treat conspirators
especially harshly. But it is quite another thing to say that
because we hate conspirators, we will treat harshly everyone
accused of conspiracy.""8
Policy Distinction: The Co-conspiratorException and
Substantive Conspiracy Law

The hearsay rule embodies judicial concern for the trustworthiness of hearsay evidence, which is not generally subject
to the various courtroom devices for testing the reliability of a
witness's perception and representation of facts. 7 By precedent
more hoary even than that pertaining to co-conspirators' statements, one class of extrajudicial declarations has always been
admissible: the admissions of a party-opponent. 8 Whether
such admissions are simply excluded from the hearsay rule
by definition or are recognized as hearsay but deemed admissible nonetheless, the rationale for their admission, although
variously expressed, 9 is basically that the party-opponent
65. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy].
66. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-ConspiratorException,
supra note 58, at 1390-91. See also Note, Preservingthe Right to Confrontation, supra
note 64, at 755.
67. See generally C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 224, at
457-59 (1954) [hereinafter cited as C. MCCORMICK]; Garland & Snow, The CoConspiratorsException to the Hearsay Rule, supra note 59, at 3-4; Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers and the Applications of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
68. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, supra note 65, at 1162-63.
69. Admissions often have the character of declarations against interest. See
Morgan, Admissions As An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355, 358-59
(1921); Comment, The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators' Declarations,supra
note 64, at 533. However, their 'admissibility has never been made contingent on
satisfaction of the conditions governing the against-interest exception. The unrestricted admissibility of admissions of a party-opponent has been explained in terms
of the adversary theory of litigation, see FED. R. Ev. 801(d)(2), Advisory Comm. Note,
at 328 (C. Boardman ed. 1973); estoppel of the declarant, see Comment, The Hearsay
Exception for Co-Conspirators'Declarations,supra note 64, at 531-32; and the ability
of the declarant to explain or rebut his statement without the aid of cross-examination,
4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048, at 4-5 (Chadbourne rev. 1972) [hereinafter cited as J.
WIOMORE].
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has no need to subject his own statement to extrinsic tests
for reliability, such as cross-examination, observation of demeanor, administration of an oath, and consequent liability to
prosecution for perjury. Since he is himself the declarant, the
party-opponent well knows the reasons, if any, for doubting the
accuracy of his admission, and can by his own testimony or
other evidence bring these reasons to the attention of the trier
of fact."
If the universal practice under Anglo-Saxon law of admitting into evidence the admissions of a party-opponent is accepted as valid, it follows that the agency rationale does suffice
to justify the co-conspirator exception when applied, as in
Gooding, to facts falling within classical civil agency doctrine.
The degree of control over the agent required to constitute such
an agency, together with rigorous application of the requirements that the declaration of the co-conspirator have taken
place during the pendency of the agency and have been in
furtherance of its object, place the defendant in almost as good
a position to evaluate the trustworthiness of the declaration,
and to contradict it if it is untrue, as he would be in were the
declaration his own admission.7
Under ordinary circumstances, however, the substantive
agency theory for defining to whom the co-conspirator exception is applicable, and the evidentiary agency rationale for explaining why it should be so applied, have long since parted
company. The social policies served by substantive conspiracy
law have led to the imposition of vicarious responsibility for the
acts of co-conspirators virtually without regard for the defendant's ability to control those acts. While this may be a logical
means of deterring persons from joining conspiracies, it does
not comport with the hearsay rule's purpose of assuring that
only reliable evidence be used to determine if the defendant
was in fact a conspirator and, if so, what in fact were the acts
of his co-conspirators for which he is to be held vicariously
responsible.
The substantive law of conspiracy pays heed to notions of
pendency and furtherance only insofar as they place rational
limits on the policy of deterrence through imposition of vicarious liability, and thus prevent visiting arbitrary retribution on
70.
71.

4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 69, § 1048, at 4-5.
Cf. People v. Steccone, 36 Cal. 2d 234, 239-40, 223 P.2d 17, 20-21 (1950).
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co-conspirators for the rest of their lives." Because of the social
policy of deterring conspiracies by forcing conspirators to assume onerous risks of vicarious liability, courts are wont to
uphold jury findings of substantive liability on almost any
state of facts conceivably suggestive that the co-conspirator's
act was during the conspiracy and in furtherance of some common objective of the conspirators.7 3 Courts have unthinkingly
transposed into evidentiary terms the increasingly lax substantive notions of what constitutes a conspiratorial agreement,
who shall be deemed parties to such an agreement, and what
acts they risk becoming accountable for vicariously. This, coupled with continual reduction of the threshold quantum of independent evidence sufficient to establish such preliminary
facts so as to invoke the co-conspirator exception, has given the
exception itself a momentum which has entirely outstripped
the braking effect of the anachronistic agency rationale and its
requirements of pendency, furtherance, and independent evidence.
D.

Critique of Alternative Rationales

Assumption of Risk
The modern mode of application of the co-conspirator exception seems to evidence judicial adherence to several rationales other than agency. Perhaps most prevalent in the cases
themselves are the unstated notions of waiver and assumption
of risk which seem to underlie such rote-like recitations of the
substantive agency theory as: "Declarations of one conspirator
may be used against the other conspirator not present on the
theory that the declarant is the agent of the other, and the
admissions of one are admissible against both under a standard
exception to the hearsay rule applicable to statements of a
party."7 In cases implicitly premised on waiver of the hearsay
rule and assumption of the risk of being tried on untrustworthy
evidence, no pretense is made that the agency relationship in
the case at hand is such as to provide guarantees that the
72. Cf. note 57 supra.
73. See, e.g., People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249-53, 290 P. 881, 882-84 (1930);
People v. Creeks, 170 Cal. 368, 374-75, 149 P. 821, 823-24 (1915); People v. Raber, 168
Cal. 316, 318, 143 P. 317, 317-18 (1914); People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 335-37, 92
P. 861, 862-64 (1907); People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572, 576 (1865); People v. Martinez, 239
Cal. App. 2d 161, 178-79, 48 Cal. Rptr. 521, 532 (1966); People v. Cowan, 38 Cal. App.
2d 231, 239, 101 P.2d 125, 130 (1940).
74. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 (1953).
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evidence admitted under the co-conspirator exception is
trustworthy notwithstanding its hearsay character. Rather,
the attitude is that the co-conspirator's declaration is a verbal
act-despite its being admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted-the risk of which is assumed by the defendant along
with the risk of liability under the substantive law for the criminal acts of co-conspirators."M
Under close scrutiny, the implications of this glib equation
of vicarious liability for substantive acts with like liability for
evidentiary verbal acts admitted for the truth of the matters
asserted prove to be profound. The agency theory of the substantive law of conspiracy, harsh as it may be, does no more
than declare that one who has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to have been a member of a conspiracy is to be held
responsible for crimes which have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have been committed by another member of
the conspiracy. To apply this agency theory to the evidentiary
law of conspiracy, as is done when the co-conspirator exception
is invoked on the basis of a conspiratorial agency which is too
fictitious to furnish any circumstantial guarantee of the trustworthiness of hearsay evidence, is to sanction successive
anomalies. First, one who is shown prima facie to have been a
member of a conspiracy is treated as bound by the statements
of his confederates, no matter how unreliable the hearsay
evidence of those statements may appear to be by conventional
legal standards; and second, such hearsay evidence, despite
being presumptively doubtful itself, may be counted in the
calculus of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt by which his
membership in the conspiracy and his liability for the crimes
of his co-conspirators is supposed to be established. Thus the
assumption-of-risk rationale is, if not outrightly irrational, certainly a draconian means of deterring the formation of conspiracies. One whose conduct permits any inference of association
6
with persons who may conceivably be conspirators" risks being
haled before a jury which will be allowed to consider what the
law otherwise deems to be intrinsically untrustworthy evidence. Under such circumstances, the jury may well return a
verdict false in some or all respects if the defendant was really
a non-conspirator, or a peripheral conspirator lacking the real
75. See Comment, The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators'Declarations,
supra note 64, at 539.
76. See People v. Massey, 151 Cal. App. 2d 623, 642, 312 P.2d 365, 377 (1957);
People v. Sorrentino, 146 Cal. App. 2d 149, 160, 303 P.2d 859, 867 (1956).
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agency relationship to the declarants necessary to enable him
to identify and expose inaccuracies in their declarations."
Res Gestae
The waiver and assumption-of-risk rationale must be deduced by implication; it is never articulated as such when, with
a passing reference to agency, the co-conspirator exception is
applied to a case in which the purported agency is manifestly
fictitious. The most common judicially stated non-agency rationale for the co-conspirator exception is that the declaration
was part of the "res gestae" of the conspiracy. The words res
gestae are frequently treated as a talisman by which conceptual difficulties with the co-conspirator exception may be conclusorily overcome in good judicial conscience. They have been
invoked with such inconsistency that one astute commentator
has forsaken efforts at reconciliation and has simply declared
that the words strike him as "a confusing term of art" creating
a "muddy area" in the law. 8 Hardly more charitable characterizations of the rubric of res gestae were forthcoming from Professor Morgan, who found it pervading the case law on vicarious admissions like a "fog," 9 and Professor McCormick, who
summarized it "as a pass-word to the admission of evidence." ' 0
As a practical matter, determined courts classify coconspirators' statements as res gestae when a patent lack of
agency makes it impossible to invoke the co-conspirator hearsay exception in its conventional form. Paralleling the development of the expansive substantive law of conspiracy, with its
sweeping vicarious liability rule, the co-conspirator exception
has been applied under the agency theory with little regard
for the furtherance requirement, which has effectively been
eliminated by construing it as the practical equivalent of pendency.' However, pendency itself has generally remained a
prerequisite to application of the co-conspirator exception
pursuant to the agency theory." Thus, it is when courts have
77. Cf. United States v. Fradkin, 81 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1935).
78. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-ConspiratorException,
supra note 58, at 1384-85 n.42.
79. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461, 467
(1929) [hereinafter cited as Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions].
80. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 274, at 587.

81. See, e.g., MODEL
Foreword, at 49; UNIFORM

CODE OF EVIDENCE

rule 508 (1942); id., comment, at 250; id.,
rule 63(9) (pamph. ed. 1953); Develop-

RULES OF EVIDENCE

ments, supra note 52, at 985-86.
82. See Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, supra note 79, at 464;
Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 671, 678-84, 737-39 (1965).
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been inclined to admit co-conspirators' declarations which
occurred after the termination of a conspiracy that they have
resorted to res gestae.83
Like admissions, the res gestae class of extrajudicial declarations is as much a negative definition of hearsay as an exception to the hearsay rule. Declarations legitimately classified as
res gestae fall within the larger class of declarations which are
admitted as verbal acts rather than for the truth of the matter
asserted, because there is some probative value to the fact that
a statement was made, entirely apart from the truth of the
matters stated." In conspiracy cases res gestae properly denotes only those declarations probative by their very existence
of the fact of a conspiratorial agreement. However, loose usage
of the doctrine to circumvent the pendency requirement of the
agency theory has, in some jurisdictions, reduced the use of res
gestae as a rationale for admitting the declarations of coconspirators to little more than an assertion that the content
of the declaration so admitted is relevant to the alleged conspiracy.85
Commentators' Analyses
Since courts have generally offered such unsatisfactory
rationales for free application of the co-conspirator exception,
commentators have long recognized the exception as a challenging problem. It is testimony to the momentum the exception has acquired as a useful tool in conspiracy prosecutions
that most commentators have conceived of their task as to
devise a rationale that fits the practice, rather than to suggest
restrictions that would make application of the rule consistent
with its ostensible agency and res gestae rationales. For years
Professor Morgan was more or less alone in arguing that declarations commonly deemed admissible as vicarious admissions
of a party-opponent frequently were dangerously lacking in realistic indicia of reliability. However, Morgan recognized that
many such declarations did have evidentiary value, even where
there was no real agency relationship between the defendant
and the declarant. Morgan suggested that a safer and more
rational way to achieve the ends legitimately served by the coconspirator exception would be to expand the hearsay rule re83.
84.
85.

See Annot., 4 A.L.R. 3d 671, 737-39 (1965).
See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618 (1953).
Developments, supra note 52, at 986.
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garding declarations against interest, freeing it from the anachronistic limitation which excluded declarations against penal
rather than proprietary or personal interests, and eliminating
the requirement that the declarant be unavailable to testify as
a witness.88
Professor Wigmore accepted at face value the coconspirator exception's complete incorporation of the substantive agency theory of vicarious liability, with little apparent
discomfort at the inapplicability of the rationale to the law of
evidence. Wigmore was prepared to postulate that even under
the fictitious agency concepts of modem conspiracy law, there
is generally some sort of residual identity of interest which
imparts to declarations by co-conspirators the same sort of
reliability imputed to admissions. Underlying Wigmore's views
on the subject was a clear distaste for the exclusionary aspects
of the hearsay rule in general. 7
The middle ground between Morgan and Wigmore was
occupied by Professor McCormick, who like Wigmore tailored
his rationale to fit the rule as applied, but who like Morgan
sought to articulate the rationale in terms of the interests of the
declarant rather than of the defendant. McCormick recognized
that courts generally applied the co-conspirator exception according to substantive agency principles, but argued that insofar as these principles entailed adherence to the furtherance
prerequisite, they were erroneous. McCormick supported a per
se rule that a declaration concerning any aspect of a conspiracy
made by a conspirator during the pendency of that conspiracy
was against the declarant's interest and should accordingly be
deemed trustworthy enough to be admissible. 8 McCormick
failed, however, to explain why this rationale would not support treating the declarations of conspirators as admissible
against anyone, rather than only the co-conspirators of the declarant.
E.

The Necessity Rationale and the Right to Confrontation

Two trends have marked modern efforts to fashion a reasonable co-conspirator exception. First, there has come the recognition that all ostensible rationales for the exception in terms
86. See Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, supra note 79, passim.
87. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 69, §§ 1077, 1079, 1080(a), at 158-61, 180, 186,
198-201.
88. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 244, at 522-23.
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of the purposes of the hearsay rule are unpersuasive and unrealistic; this has led to the proposal of a new rationale more
responsive to the actual motivations of the courts applying the
exception.
[Tihe co-conspirators' exception has expanded
rather than shrunk which is not typical of rules without a
reason. The true reason for the exception explains both its
growth and the parallelism of that expansion to the expansion of the law of conspiracy. That reason is simple: there
is great probative need for such testimony. Conspiracy is
a hard thing to prove. The substantive law of conspiracy
has vastly expanded. This created a tension solved by relaxation of the law of evidence. Conspirators' declarations
are admitted out of necessity."9
The emergence of the necessity rationale has focused attention
on how necessity may be served without treating accused conspirators unfairly through wholesale admission of unreliable
evidence. In line with Morgan's concept of analyzing the individual circumstances of co-conspirators' declarations to determine their reliability, it has been proposed as a correlate to the
necessity rationale that trial courts should exercise their discretion to filter out particularly unreliable declarations from the
0
generally admissible mass of co-conspirators' statements.
The second trend in the development of a workable rule
and rationale governing evidentiary use of co-conspirators'
declarations has been the recognition that satisfaction of
some sort of minimum standards of reliability is a constitutional prerequisite to the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
Although tentative indications that the hearsay rule of the
common law was to be deemed incorporated by reference in
the sixth amendment's right to confrontation have been disavowed, the United States Supreme Court has indicated the
necessity of particularized analysis of the reliability of hearsay
evidence, even where the evidence is of a class generally excepted from the hearsay rule.9 This development has sparked
new efforts at reformulating the co-conspirator exception in
89. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, supra note 65, at 1166.
90. Id. at 1166-67.
91. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-90 (1970) (Stewart, J.) (plurality opinion);
id. at 97-100 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reaching same result under less exacting due
process test).
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terms relevant to constitutional demands for minimal reliability in the absence of opportunity for cross-examination. 2
III.

APPLICATION OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR ExCEPTION UNDER
CALIFORNIA LAW

Thus far this article has sought to examine in general
terms the origins of the co-conspirator exception; the purposes
it serves; the various rationales for the exception proposed by
those seeking to demonstrate a rational link between its purpose and its application; and the modern trends of analysis and
decision which seek to reconcile in contemporary practice the
conflict between the substantive policy of penalizing conspirators, and the evidentiary policies-to some extent of constitutional dimension-against premising proof of conspiracy on
untrustworthy evidence. The article has purposely made only
incidental mention of California law in the course of this survey, for it is California law which is now to be examined in
greater detail as a particular thread in the nationwide fabric of
evidence law.
A.

Independent Evidence

California's adherence to the independent evidence requirement of the co-conspirator exception has previously been
discussed in the context of the Leach case and the attempted
9 3 California's
reconciliation of Leach with Saling.
independent
evidence requirement conforms to the national norm, save for
Leach's added insistence on independent evidence of any subsidiary objectives of an allegedly "continuing" conspiracy.9 4
In the ensuing discussion of further contrasts and comparisons between California law and that generally prevailing in
other American jurisdictions, Leach and Saling are left to one
side, the better to demonstrate at the conclusion that the reasoning of Saling, even as rewoven in Leach, does not conform
to the seemly pattern of the pertinent law.
B.

Furtherance
Although undoubtedly influenced by the national debate

92. See Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator
Exception, supra note 58, passim. See also Note, Preserving the Right to
Confrontation, supra note 64, at 753-56.
93. See text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
94. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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on the co-conspirator exception, California's treatment of the
exception has remained somewhat independent of the national
tendency towards expanding the exception. While most jurisdictions have struggled in modern times to ease or eliminate
the furtherance requirement as formulated by what is regarded
as outmoded precedent, California courts have expressly applied it, despite the legislature's apparent intent to sanction its
elimination. Section 1870 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
1872, which remained in effect until its repeal by the Evidence
Code in 1966,11 codified the co-conspirator exception as follows:
"[E]vidence may be given upon a trial of the following facts:
• . .After proof of a conspiracy, the act or declaration of a
conspirator against his co-conspirator, and relating to the conspiracy . . . ."I Although section 1870 quite clearly preserved
97
the independent evidence requirement, its only other requirement, that the declaration be one "relating to the conspiracy,"
seems to have demanded no more than mere relevancy. Yet to
the confusion of the commentators,98 California courts have
always conditioned the admissibility of the declarations of coconspirators on their having been made during the pendency
and in furtherance of the conspiracies in question, notwithstanding the seemingly less restrictive text of section 1870. And
while the earliest pendency and furtherance cases concerned
post-termination declarations which were inadmissible under
both requirements," it was soon squarely decided that furtherance was a requirement of independent force and effect from
that of pendency.1°0
The distinction between furtherance and pendency has
been retained in modern California law, although it is the rare
case which articulates the distinction clearly. When a declaration has occurred after the termination of the conspiracy, the
disabling requirements of pendency and furtherance are gener95. See Cal. Stats. (1965), ch. 299.
96. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1870(6) (West 1955).
97. People v. Irwin, 77 Cal. 494, 502, 20 P. 56, 58 (1888).
98. See Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, supra note 79, at 465
& n.8; Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, supra note 65, at 1169 & n.49.
99. People v. Irwin, 77 Cal. 494, 502, 20 P. 56, 58 (1888); People v. Aleck, 61 Cal.
137, 138 (1882); People v. English, 52 Cal. 212, 213 (1877); People v. Moore, 45 Cal.
19, 21 (1872).
100. Compare People v. Smith, 151 Cal. 619, 625-26, 91 P. 511, 513 (1907) with
People v. Oldham, 111 Cal. 648, 652-53, 44 P. 312, 313-14 (1898) and Del Campo v.
Camarillo, 154 Cal. 647, 653, 98 P. 1049, 1052-53 (1908) (civil action to rescind fraudulent deed).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

ally invoked in a single judicial breath;'"' and when a declaration occurs during a conspiracy and is relevant enough to be
offered against the defendant, its role in furtherance of the
conspiracy is usually so self-evident as to warrant no more than
a conclusory reference to the furtherance requirement in stating the manifest admissibility of the declaration pursuant to
the co-conspirator exception. 02 However, the question of furtherance independent of pendency has been presented where a
co-conspirator has made statements upon his apprehension
which incriminate the defendant, who at the time of the declarations may still have been pursuing the aims of the conspiracy
individually or through other co-conspirators. 1 3
California's continuing commitment to the furtherance
requirement was emphatically demonstrated by its express inclusion in Evidence Code section 1223,14 the successor to the
pertinent part of section 1870 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 05
The eclipse of the furtherance requirement in most American
jurisdictions had been recognized by both the Model Code of
1 which,
Evidence,'"1 and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 07
while retaining the pendency requirement, substituted a relevancy requirement for that of furtherance. In proposing the
Evidence Code, the California Law Revision Commission rejected this formulation of the co-conspirator exception and
recommended one which "restate[d] existing California law,"
including the furtherance requirement. 8
C. Pendency
California's treatment of the pendency requirement has
been similarly independent of the national norm in at least one
101. See, e.g., People v. Gilliland, 39 Cal. App. 2d 250, 262-63, 103 P.2d 179, 18586 (1940).
102. See, e.g., People v. Shaffer, 38 Cal. App. 2d 421, 429, 101 P.2d 560, 564-65
(1940); People v. Whittaker, 18 Cal. App. 2d 396, 400, 63 P.2d 1202, 1204-05 (1937);
People v. Cook, 10 Cal. App. 2d 54, 57, 51 P.2d 169, 170 (1935).
103. Callan v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 2d 652, 664-65, 22 Cal. Rptr. 508,
515-16 (1962). See also People v. Roberts, 40 Cal. 2d 483, 489, 254 P.2d 501, 504 (1953).
104. See note 9 supra.
105. See 7 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N, REP., RECOMMENDATIONS, & STUDIES,
Recommendation Proposing an Evidence Code § 1223, comment at 229 (1965).
106. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508(b)(1942).
107. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(9) (pamph. ed. 1953).
108. 4 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N, REP., RECOMMENDATIONS, & STUDIES, Tentative

Hearsay Recommendation rule 63(9), comment at 322 (1963). California's lead in
reaffirming the furtherance requirement in its Evidence Code has been followed in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. Ev. 801(d)(2)(E). The Advisory Committee which
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respect. It has long been established in California that independent evidence is required of any subsidiary objective relied
upon to continue a conspiracy beyond the commission of the
contemplated substantive crime.109
California law-at least prior to Saling-never embraced
the concept that a conspiracy, once proven prima facie to have
existed, is presumed to continue until such date as the defendant can prove it was terminated." 0 Nor has it otherwise sought
to evade the pendency requirement under the bogus banner of
res gestae.1' When evidence of some sort of continuing conduct
by one or more conspirators more or less related to the original
object of the conspiracy has been presented in a case, however,
California courts have shown themselves no less susceptible to
confusion than the courts of other jurisdictions. The problem
arises from a frequent failure to distinguish questions of the
substantive law of conspiracy, the relevance of otherwise admissible evidence, and the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
The cases thus tend to treat as a single body of law and source
of precedent the rulings of courts faced with three separate
classes of pendency questions." 2
All three classes of cases involve acts or declarations which
occurred after the arguable termination of the alleged conspiracy. What differs is the nature of these acts and declarations,
and the purpose for which the evidence of such acts or declarations is offered. When these differences go unrecognized,
rules fashioned in one class of cases may be applied unthinkingly to achieve quite different and possibly unjustified ends
in another class of cases.
Substantive Liability Cases
The first class involves cases where the issue is whether the
drafted the Federal Rules commented that "the agency theory of conspiracy is at best
a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility beyond that already
established," and thus adhered to "the accepted pattern" of both pendency and furtherance requirements, citing inter alia, section 1223 of the California Evidence Code.
FED. R. Ev. 801(d)(2)(E), Advisory Comm. Note at 330-31 (C. Boardman ed. 1973).
109. See People v. Opie, 123 Cal. 294, 296, 55 P. 989, 990 (1899); People v. Irwin,
77 Cal. 494, 505, 20 P. 56, 59-60 (1888); People v. Sorrentino, 146 Cal. App. 2d 149,
160-61, 303 P.2d 859, 867-68 (1956); People v. Gilliland, 39 Cal. App. 2d 250, 256, 103
P.2d 179, 182-83 (1940).
110. Cf. Coates v. United States, 59 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1932); Developments,
supra note 52, at 961 & n.297.
111. See text accompanying notes 78-85 supra.
112. See, e.g., People v. Schmidt, 33 Cal. App. 426, 443-47, 165 P. 555, 562-64
(1917).
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defendant is to be held vicariously liable under the substantive
law of conspiracy for the act of a co-conspirator. The defendant
contends on appeal that any conspiracy in which he might have
been involved had terminated by the time of the coconspirator's act. The court's concern in such cases is with the
usual pendency and furtherance tests of substantive conspiracy
law and its purpose of deterring to the fullest rational extent
the formation of conspiracies. Thus the appellate court rules
that as long as there was some evidence that there was an
unaccomplished and unabandoned common object of the conspirators, and that the co-conspirator's act was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the agreement to pursue such object, it was legally permissible for the jury to resolve adversely
to the defendant the purely factual issues of pendency and
furtherance.
Unfortunately, such rulings have since early in California's
statehood generally been phrased as if this determination of
substantive liability were no different from the determination
of the admissibility of a co-conspirator's declaration."' It is
testimony to this long entrenched conceptual confusion that
one of the cases cited most frequently on pendency problems
and the co-conspirator exception is the substantive case of
People v. Holmes."4 In Holmes, the problem was whether
members of a labor union were liable as co-conspirators for the
death of a workman who, having ignored prior entreaties to
desist from working for a non-union contractor, was accosted
and assaulted by a mob of union members. The defendants
contended that there was no evidence of any agreement to use
violence, that
the only agreement shown was to go to deceased and ask
him to quit work . . .and that anything occurring there-

after was an independent act and had nothing to do with
the common design; that whatever conspiracy there existed was at an end, and that defendants were no more
responsible thereafter than they would be bound by statements of any coconspirator after the termination of the
conspiracy." 5
The court acknowledged the "well-settled" rule that "after the
conspiracy is terminated, and the crime has been committed,
113.
114.
115.

See, e.g., People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572, 575-76 (1865).
118 Cal. 444, 50 P. 675 (1897).
Id. at 458, 50 P. at 680 (citations omitted).
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the admissions of coconspirators are not admissible against
others," but ruled that the "facts and circumstances here
raised a question for the jury to decide as to when the conspir".."I" Noting that groups
acy, if any there was, terminated ..
the deceased with
twice
approached
had
members
union
of
time they had
the
third
requests that he cease work, and that
arrived en masse and assaulted him "as soon as deceased came
down off the scaffolding within reach," the court concluded,
"[l]t was for the jury to say whether this violence was not a
part of the original design.""' 7
The problem with the undiscriminating equation of the
pendency and furtherance tests for substantive liability for the
acts of co-conspirators with the nominally similar tests for the
application of the co-conspirator exception is that quite different policies are in issue, as this article has previously sought
to demonstrate in analyzing the inadequacies of the agency
rationale for the co-conspirator exception."' The operative consideration for deciding the pendency and furtherance questions
in the substantive context is simply whether the act of the coconspirator was a risk which the defendant can legitimately be
deemed to have assumed as a natural consequence of his joining the conspiracy. Technical considerations of whether the
conspirators had any shared objective beyond the commission
of the contemplated substantive crime thus play little part in
determining pendency for purposes of imposing vicarious substantive liability. For instance, it is well established that even
when armed conspirators already have consummated or abandoned their contemplated crime, each remains vicariously liable for violent acts committed by any individual conspirator
in attempting immediately thereafter to avoid apprehension., 9
Relevancy Cases
The second class of cases presenting pendency problems
involve certain acts (including verbal acts) committed by co116. Id. at 459, 50 P. at 680.
117. Id.
118. See text accompanying notes 65-73 supra.
119. People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 794, 409 P.2d 222, 232-33, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382,
392-93 (1966); People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 335-37, 92 P. 861, 862-63 (1907);
People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572, 576 (1865); People v. Corkery, 134 Cal. App. 294, 296-99,
25 P.2d 257, 258-59 (1933).
The court in Corkery made especially clear the policy of deterrence through assumption of risk which underlay the vicarious substantive liability imposed upon the
defendant in that case. Rejecting the defendant's claim that his flight from the robbery
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conspirators after the arguable termination of the conspiracy.
Evidence of these acts is offered at the defendant's trial for
conspiracy, or for the substantive crime committed by the conspirators, because these subsequent acts are supposedly probative of the defendant's guilt of the charged crime. The issue
here is really not pendency at all, but relevancy. The evidence
of the subsequent acts is not offered to establish the defendant's substantive liability for those acts nor, insofar as the
subsequent acts were declaratory, is evidence of the acts admitted for the truth of the matters asserted.' ° The subseconstituted an abandonment of or withdrawal from his conspiracy to commit robbery,
thereby relieving him of liability for the further acts of his co-conspirator, the court
said:
It should be clear that an abandonment of an intention to commit a
criminal offense should be a free and voluntary act on the part of the
person seeking to commit it. .

.

. [I]t is patent that the withdrawal

from the attempt should not be immediately caused by a desire to escape
identification, detection or arrest. In other words, where an overt act has
disclosed the intention of a person to commit a criminal offense, his
subsequent intention to abandon, or to withdraw from, the commission
of such offense, or its consequences, should be manifested by his own free
and voluntary act, as distinguished from conduct induced or prompted
by outside or foreign influences.
Id. at 297, 25 P.2d at 258.
120. Two vintage cases from the court of appeal show some fleeting recognition
of two aspects of this distinction between pendency and relevancy. In People v. Lorraine, 90 Cal. App. 317, 330, 265 P. 893, 898 (1928), see text accompanying note 137
infra, the court acknowledged that evidence of the act of a co-conspirator did not raise
a hearsay problem, but it made virtually nothing of its distinction between hearsay
evidence and evidence of acts. The court treated evidence of the act of a co-conspirator
as if the defendant were being charged with liability therefor, and upheld admission
of the evidence only insofar as the act in question was "done under circumstances
bearing the reasonable inference that it was a part and in furtherance of the original
common design." Id. The court relied on the Stanley-Irwin line of cases which had
failed altogether to appreciate the hearsay distinction. Id. See text accompanying
notes 129-33 infra. Thus the insight of Lorrainewas buried beneath unsound precedent
unthinkingly applied.
In People v. Collier, 111 Cal. App. 215, 295 P. 898 (1931), the court made the
complementary observation that acts of co-conspirators offered as evidence of the
existence of a conspiracy are distinguishable from acts of co-conspirators for which the
defendant is sought to be held criminally liable.
Repeating the "rule ... that evidence of the separate acts and declarations of one
co-conspirator is admissible against all the other conspirators after the conspiracy has
been established," the court nevertheless discerned that "the real question involved
. . . is whether this testimony was relevant. The question of the relevancy of testimony
is frequently confused with the question of the weight and sufficiency of that testimony
to prove a particular issue." Id. at 236, 295 P. at 906 (emphasis added). The court
stressed that the fact of conspiracy can rarely be proved, "'otherwise than by the
establishment of independent facts bearing more or less closely or remotely upon the
common design,' " thus justifying "greater liberality" in admitting circumstantial
evidence tending to show the existence of a conspiracy. Id. at 236, 295 P. at 906.
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quent acts are offered as proof of a crime and the defendant's
personal or vicarious responsibility therefor; the fact that they
occurred after the charged crime does not affect their admissibility unless they occurred at so remote a time that they lack
relevance to the charge being tried.''
As the United States Supreme Court has observed in an
opinion considering precisely this problem, Lutwak v. United
States, 2 ' cases holding that
the declarations of a conspirator do not bind the coconspirator if made after the conspiracy has ended . . .
[have] dealt only with declarations of one conspirator
after the conspiracy has ended. They have no application
to acts of a conspirator or others which were relevant to
prove the conspiracy. True, there is dictum in Logan v.
United States [144 U.S. 263, 309 (1892)], frequently repeated, which would limit the admissibility of both acts
and declarations to the person performing them. This
statement of the rule overlooks the fact that the objection
to the declarations is that they are hearsay. This reason is
not applicable to acts which are not intended to be a
means of expression. The acts [at issue herein], being
relevant to prove the conspiracy, were admissible, even
though they might have occurred after the conspiracy
ended.'23

The Court did not specifically discuss in Lutwak the admissibility of post-conspiracy declarations which are not ofAccordingly, when the question of the common design of a criminal enterprise and the question whether that common design extended beyond the
point of time of the actual commission of the act constituting the overt
act alleged are matters in issue those questions are to be determined by
the jury and any competent evidence which tends to prove the extent of
the conspiracy and any competent evidence of acts or declarations tending to prove this common design is relevant to the issues before the jury.
Such evidence ...

is admitted under the circumstances above stated for

the purpose of proving the common design and extent of the conspiracy
alleged.
Id. at 237, 295 P. at 907.
121. Of course, even if relevant, evidence of such acts may be inadmissible if its
probative value is outweighed by the possible prejudicial effect of its admission. See
CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 210, 352 (West 1966); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 229, at 479.
122. 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
123. Id. at 618.
The facts before the Court in Lutwak provide an apt illustration of the way in
which the post-conspiracy acts of a co-conspirator can be relevant at a trial for that
conspiracy.
In this case, the essential fact of the conspiracy was the existence of
phony marriage ceremonies entered into for the sole purpose of deceiving
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fered for the truth of the matter asserted, but such evidence
appears to have figured in that case.' 4 Any lingering doubt as
to the admissibility of such declarations under federal law was
dispelled by the Court's recent decision in Anderson v. United
States.2 '
[A]s the Court emphasized in Lutwak, the requirement
that out-of-court declarations by a conspirator be shown to

have been made while the conspiracy charged was still in
progress and in furtherance thereof arises only because the
declaration would otherwise be hearsay. The ongoing conspiracy requirement is therefore inapplicable to evidence,
such as that of acts of alleged conspirators, which would
not otherwise be hearsay ...
* * * Out-of-court statements constitute hearsay only
when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. .

.

. [Tihose statements [were introduced]

simply to prove that the statements were made ....
[T]he prosecution was not contending that anything...
said

. . .

was true ....

* * * The prior testimony was accordingly admissible
simply if relevant in some way to prove the conspiracy
charged. 6
the immigration authorities and perpetrating a fraud upon the United
States. Acts which took place after the conspiracy ended which were
relevant to show the spuriousness of the marriages and the intent of the
parties in going through the marriage ceremonies were competent-such

as the fact that the parties continued to live apart after they came to the
United States; that money was paid the so-called wives as a consideration
for their part in the so-called marriages; and that suits were started to
terminate whatever legal relationship there might have been upon the
record.
Id. at 617 (emphasis in original).
124. There was testimony in Lutwak that after their admission to the United
States-at which time the conspiracy was deemed to have ended-the conspirators
who had participated in fraudulent marriages held themselves out to be unmarried or
as married to persons other than their putative spouses at the time of entry. 344 U.S.
at 609. Such representations of marital status, although declaratory in form, were
presumably admissible against all the conspirators as verbal acts rather than as hearsay evidence of the truth of the matter asserted in the declarations. The government
did not contend that the marriages in question had not formally occurred or were
illegal, but simply that they had been entered into in bad faith. See 344 U.S. at 62021 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The post-entry misrepresentations of marital status by the
Lutwak conspirators were false, and hence had relevance as verbal acts tending to
establish the existence of the prior, pre-entry naturalization fraud conspiracy. See note
126 infra.
125. 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
126. Id. at 219-21.
The post-conspiracy declarations at issue in Anderson were made during testimony at a state judicial hearing into the validity of an election. The declarants and
others were later charged under federal law with conspiracy to commit election fraud,
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of California has been
no more proof against confusing the evidentiary status of the
acts and the declarations of co-conspirators than was the
United States Supreme Court prior to Lutwak. This article has
already discussed the erroneous equation in earlier cases of the
dissimilar pendency considerations pertaining on the one hand
and the jury was instructed that it could use the prior, perjured testimony against all
the defendants if it found that at the time of that testimony the charged conspiracy
was still in progress. Rather than decide the pendency question, which turned on a
complex question of statutory construction, the Supreme Court decided the issue on
the "simpler, and more settled grounds ... [of] the basic principles of evidence and
conspiracy law set down in Lutwak." Id. at 218.
The election contest testimony of Tomblin and Browning . . . was not
admitted into evidence in the [conspiracy] trial to prove the truth of
anything asserted therein. Quite the contrary, the point of the prosecutor's introducing those statements was simply to prove that the statements were made so as to establish a foundation for later showing,
through other admissible evidence, that they were false. . . . The primary justification for the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross-examine the absent declarant whose out-ofcourt statement is introduced into evidence. Here, since the prosecution
was not contending that anything Tomblin or Browning said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in crossexamining them so as to put their credibility in issue ....
Since these prior statements were not hearsay, the jury did not have
to make a preliminary finding that the conspiracy charged . . . was still
in progress before it could consider them as evidence against the other
defendants. The prior testimony was accordingly admissible simply if
relevant in some way to prove the conspiracy charged.
Id. at 219-21 (citations omitted).
In the course of holding that these prior statements were not hearsay, the Court
noted in Anderson that "evidence is not hearsay when it is used only to prove that a
prior statement was made and not to prove the truth of the statement," 417 U.S. at
220 n.8, even though the relevance of the statement to the conspiracy charge is dependent on it appearing from other admissible evidence that the matters asserted in the
statement were in fact not true. It bears considerable emphasis that while ostensibly
false statements may be relevant and admissible evidence as acts rather than as
declarations offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the converse does not
hold. Statements lacking any intrinsic "operative" significance, see C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 67, § 228, at 463-64, cannot be offered merely as acts rather than as evidence
of the truth of the matters asserted, on the theory that since the statements appear to
be true in the light of other evidence, ergo there is some relevancy in the very fact that
the statements were made. The relevancy of such statements-as-acts is wholly dependent on the trier of fact finding, in effect, that the statements are true. For the reasons
which follow such statements-as-acts must be deemed as a matter of law to be either
irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative. Cf. Comment, The Hearsay Exception
for Co-Conspirators'Declarations,supra note 64, at 537-38.
Obviously, neither the mere fact that a statement was made nor the matter asserted in it can be considered in determining the truth of the statement and hence the
relevance of the act of making the statement to the criminal charge for which the party
against whom it is offered is being tried. This would be a classic instance of raising
the statement-as-act into relevancy by its own bootstraps. Cf. Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942).
If the matter asserted in the statement is in effect an accusation that the party
committed the charged crime-i.e., if the statement cannot be deemed true if the party
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to substantive criminal liability for the acts of co-conspirators,

and on the other hand to the admissibility of hearsay declarations of co-conspirators. 17 This confusion was exemplified by
the tendency of the California Supreme Court, like the United
States Supreme Court and contemporaneous commentators, to
articulate the pendency and furtherance requirement of conspiracy law in a single omnibus rule encompassing all acts and
declarations deemed "binding" on the accused, regardless of
the substantive or evidentiary nature of the particular "liability" involved.'28 Thus it is hardly surprising to find venerable
California authority compounding the substantive -evidentiary
confusion in conspiracy law by declaring inadmissible, for failure to satisfy the pendency requirement, non-hearsay evidence
of post-conspiracy acts and declarations of co-conspirators offered to prove the existence of a conspiracy, which conspiracy
was either the crime charged or the theory under which the
accused was alleged to be vicariously responsible for the crime
charged.
is found to be innocent of the crime charged-then the relevance of the statement-asact is entirely dependent on the antecedent resolution of the ultimate issue of the guilt
of the party against whom the statement-as-act is offered. Such a statement-as-act is
accordingly irrelevant as a matter of law, since it can hardly be probative of an issue
which must be decided prior to any consideration of the statement-as-act.
If the statement merely asserts matter collateral to the ultimate issue in the case,
there remains the problem of the trier of fact performing a "mental gymnastic," Nash
v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, Cir. J.) amounting to a
quadruple somersault. First, the trier must scrupulously not consider the content of
the statement as evidence bearing on the trier's determination of whether the content
of the statement is true and the statement-as-act thus relevant; second, the trier must
then assess the probative weight of the fact of the statement as evidence of any of the
ultimate issues in the case while, thirdly, steadfastly ignoring the content of the statement, notwithstanding the circumstance that, fourthly, the fact of the statement as
an act has relevance only because the trier has independently found the content of the
statement to be true. No such feat is demanded when, as in Anderson, a statement's
relevancy as an act is dependent on the statement's being false, since the trier is
unlikely to err by considering the statement as evidence of the truth of the matters
asserted when the trier has previously found the statement to be false.
These are but particularly troublesome and difficult to articulate examples of the
fact that declarations offered as verbal acts rather than as hearsay evidence of the truth
of the matters asserted generally present problems of prejudice to which the trial courts
must be alert. In the context of a particular declaration offered merely as a verbal act
it may be wholly unrealistic to expect a jury to disregard the content of the assertion.
See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 623 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Trial
courts must be ready in such situations to apply Evidence Code section 352 (exclusion
of unduly prejudicial evidence), lest the characterization of statements as acts become
a subterfuge for getting jury convictions based on hearsay evidence. Cf. People v.
Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).
127. See text accompanying notes 65-73, 113-19 supra.
128. See Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 309 (1892); People v. Aleck, 61
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The first such California case appears to have been People
v. Stanley."9 The defendant had been tried separately for a
robbery allegedly committed in concert with three others, and
had been convicted of a lesser included offense. The trial court
had admitted over objection evidence of the flight of one of the
defendant's co-conspirators after arrest. Relying on People v.
Moore,301 a hearsay case, and two treatises, the court reversed
the judgment, declaring:
The rule is well settled that the acts of an accomplice
are not evidence against the accused, unless they constitute a part of the res gestae, and occur during the pendency
of the criminal enterprise, and are in furtherance of its
objects.
The flight of the accomplice in this case occurred after
the criminal enterprise had ended, and was not in furtherance of its object, nor a part of the res gestae.
The evidence was therefore inadmissible. 3 '
The holding in Stanley was expansively reaffirmed in
Cal. 137, 138 (1882); People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572, 576 (1865).
129. 47 Cal. 113 (1873).
One earlier case made a similar mistake in confusing the agency limitations of the
co-conspirator exception-pendency, furtherance, and independent evidence-with
the relevance of post-conspiracy acts and declarations of co-conspirators offered to
prove either the existence of a conspiracy or the commission of certain crimes by the
conspirators. People v. Trim, 39 Cal. 75 (1870), concerned a defendant charged with
the statutory crime of committing arson with the intent to defraud an insurer. The
court held declarations made after the fire by a co-conspirator who requested payment
from the insurer admissible because, under the terms of the statute, the offense was
not complete until the fraud against the insurer had been consummated or abandoned;
but in so holding, the court unnecessarily discussed the pendency, furtherance, and
independent evidence requirements. The declarations were not admitted as hearsay to
prove the truth of the assertions. Given the intent required under the statute, the
request for payment was an "operative" verbal act and as such was relevant evidence
of the crime charged and the underlying conspiracy. Due to the specialized nature of
the substantive crime in issue, Trim has been cited only once in California law as
authority for the pendency of a conspiracy. People v. Fay, 82 Cal. App. 62, 255 P. 239
(1927), purported to rely on Trim for the apparent proposition that arson conspiracies
never end until the abandonment of endeavors to collect insurance. Id. at 68, 255 P.
at 242.
130. 45 Cal. 19 (1872).
131. 47 Cal. at 118.
Despite its purported reliance on the pendency and furtherance requirements of
the substantive law of conspiracy and the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule,
the court in Stanley appears also to have believed that any probative value of the
evidence was somehow outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Although the defendant
therein could not be convicted of robbery unless the prosecution proved that some one
of the conspirators had actually committed the robbery, the court seemed to feel that
since the conspiracy had been amply shown it was unfair to bring in the evidence of
the co-conspirator's flight, which as proof of the conspiracy was cumulative, and as
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People v. Irwin,'32 which involved a murder allegedly perpetrated by a conspiracy that included the defendant within its
ranks. The trial court had instructed the jury that if it found
some of the defendant's alleged co-conspirators "'guilty of
falsehood, evasion, and silence, when questioned during the
death of [the victim], you may consider [these], or any other
criminating circumstances found in the testimony, as tending
in some measure to establish the fact of a criminal conspiracy
as charged.'" The supreme court, relying solely on Stanley,
declared such evidence to have been erroneously admitted.
"No falsehood, evasion, or silence of a conspirator, occurring
after the death of [the victim], was admissible in evidence
against the defendant under any circumstances." '33
Since Irwin, courts have become less hostile to prosecutorial use of conspiracy as a shortcut to convictions for participation in organized, sophisticated criminal activity which
might otherwise not be susceptible to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is a curiosity, however, that courts intent on
draconian application of conspiracy laws have nonetheless
perpetuated the erroneous belief that evidence of the acts of
co-conspirators is necessarily hearsay and hence admissible
to establish the existence of a conspiracy only when these
proof of the robbery would have been admissible only against the fleeing coconspirator, had he been tried jointly with the defendant.
It is well settled that the flight of a person suspected of crime is a circumstance to be weighed by the jury, as tending, in some degrees, to prove a
consciousness of guilt, and is entitled to more or less weight, according
to the circumstances of the particular case. . . . At most it is but a
circumstance tending to establish a consciousness of guilt in the person
fleeing: and it would be extending the principle to a great length to hold
that the flight of one person tends to establish the guilt of another person.
We have been referred to no case which goes to that extent.
Id. (citation omitted).
In a companion case to Stanley arising out of the same robbery, the court provided
support for a probative value/prejudicial effect construction of Stanley by holding, on
a more complete record of the evidence adduced at trial, that the evidence of the coconspirator's flight was admissible for the purpose of showing the opportunity of the
conspirators, who had been arrested directly after the crime, to dispose of the unrecovered fruits of the robbery. The holding in Stanley was limited to "the facts as then
presented." People v. Collins, 48 Cal. 277, 279 (1874). If the pendency holding in
Stanley was thus mischievous dicta, it was not authoritatively recognized as such until
it had been adopted by other cases and had thereby become firmly entrenched in the
law. Compare People v. Irwin, 77 Cal. 494, 502, 20 P. 56, 58 (1888) with People v.
Lorraine, 90 Cal. App. 317, 332-33, 265 P. 893, 899-900 (1928).
132. 77 Cal. 494, 20 P. 56 (1888).
133. 77 Cal. at 506, 20 P. at 60.
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acts have occurred during the pendency of the conspiracy.
This pervasive misconception has resulted in a long line of
wrongly reasoned but rightly decided cases by courts which
were anxious to uphold convictions based on evidence of the
acts of co-conspirators committed after the conspiracies had
arguably terminated. As a result of their misapprehension of
the nature of hearsay evidence, such courts have felt obliged
to rule, on various sets of facts, that arguably terminated
conspiracies were in contemplation of law still pendent at the
time of the co-conspirators' acts. Thus they have unnecessarily held in connection with the admissibility of relevant, nonhearsay evidence of the existence of a conspiracy: (1) that a
conspiracy to "loot" an estate by probating a forged will
continued through the charged crime of perjury at the probate proceeding to subsequent acts such as attempted
subornation of perjury before the grand jury, because the
subornation was "necessary for the conspirators to avoid
detection, keep themselves out of the state prison, and keep
up the deception they were practicing on the probate court
in order to realize anything from their crimes";'34 (2) that a
conspiracy to coerce a woman into marrying a spumed suitor
continued after the kidnaping and rape (the charged crime) of
the prosecutrix, and included the subsequent attempt of a coconspirator to induce the prosecutrix to marry the rapist by
representing to her that she was unworthy of anyone else;'35 (3)
that a conspiracy to commit robbery "was not ended until the
spoils had been divided" and hence encompassed the "movements and activities," presumably directed to avoiding arrest,
of the defendant's co-conspirators after the robbery in question; 3' (4) that a conspiracy to commit grand theft included "a
scheme to evade arrest and escape punishment" and hence
encompassed evasive acts of co-conspirators who, after the
theft, registered in a hotel under false names;'3 7 (5) that a conspiracy which initially contemplated multiple crimes continued after commission of the only crime shown by any evidence
actually to have been committed by conspirators;' (6) that a
conspiracy to commit murder encompassed a co-conspirator's
134.
135.
136.
v. Fay, 82
were later
137.
(extensive
138.

People v. Rodley, 131 Cal. 240, 254, 63 P. 351, 356 (1900).
People v. Mazzurco, 49 Cal. App. 275, 278, 193 P. 164, 166 (1920).
People v. Dean, 66 Cal. App. 602, 608, 226 P. 943, 946 (1924); accord, People
Cal. 62, 68, 255 P. 239, 242 (1927) (grand theft; evidence that stolen bonds
sold, and stolen checks were later cashed).
People v. Lorraine, 90 Cal. App. 317, 326-34, 265 P. 893, 897-900 (1928)
analysis of prior cases). But see note 120 supra).
People v. Sampsell, 104 Cal. App. 431, 438-39, 286 P. 434, 437 (1930) (bank
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evasive acts and declarations after the charged crime of murder
had been completed because "the purpose of the criminal enterprise extended beyond the act of killing [the victim] and
included a plot also to escape punishment therefor by inducing
the authorities to believe that [the decedent] was the unfortunate victim of a traffic accident";'39 (7) that a conspiracy to
bribe city officials to appoint a particular chief of police expected to be friendly to gambling interests continued after the
fact of the desired appointment, because the bribes consisted
in part of promises of a future share in increased bookmaking
receipts; 40 and (8) that a conspiracy to commit grand theft not
only extended through the division of the spoils but also, when
such division did not yield a co-conspirator the promised
amount, encompassed still later acts undertaken "in compliance with a promise to pay an accessory a specified sum for his
participation in the crime .
Hearsay Cases
The third class of cases in California law dealing with the
acts or declarations of co-conspirators after the arguable termination of the alleged conspiracy consists of the only such cases
actually involving hearsay. In this class of cases the declaration
of a co-conspirator is admitted at trial to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, and the question on appeal is whether the
declaration satisfies the pendency requirement of the coconspirator exception. These cases offer the only body of
precedent bearing directly on the pendency issues posed by
Saling and Leach.
Almost all of these cases have two common characteristics:
their age and their reversal of the trial court. Many of the very
early cases were relatively simple, concerning conspiracies
which were not even contended to have continued through the
time of the declarations in issue' Nonetheless, these initial
cases established the principle of unwavering insistence on the
pendency requirement to which the California Supreme Court
steadfastly adhered in the face of later efforts by resourceful
robbery followed by purchase of firearms by co-conspirator); accord, People v. Williams, 30 Cal. App. 2d 234, 239, 85 P.2d 974, 976-77 (1938) (assault on strikebreaker
followed by payment to co-conspirator for assault).
139. People v. Tinnin, 136 Cal. App. 301, 306, 28 P.2d 951, 953-54 (1934).
140. People v. Suter, 43 Cal. App. 2d 444, 457-59, 111 P.2d 23, 30-32 (1941).
141. People v. Ross, 46 Cal. App. 2d 385, 396, 116 P.2d 81, 87 (1941).
142. See, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 71 Cal. 569, 575, 12 P. 783, 786 (1887); People
v. Aleck, 61 Cal. 137, 138 (1882); People v. English, 52 Cal. 212, 213 (1877); People v.
Moore, 45 Cal. 19, 21 (1872).
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prosecutors to demonstrate the continuation of conspiracies
despite the accomplishment of their principal objectives.'
Although occasional cases have summarily reaffirmed the
pendency requirement in passing on the admissibility of coconspirators' hearsay declarations,'44 few modern cases actually
dealing with hearsay evidence have had to resolve seriously
contested questions whether particular conspiracies were still
pendent at the time of co-conspirators' statements. As previously discussed, most such purported rulings on the circumstances constituting conspiracies are undermined by the
courts' failure to discriminate between pendency and relevancy
problems."
At least one of the cases that lumped together "acts and
declarations" for pendency purposes,'46 however, actually involved a co-conspirator's declaration which by any analysis was
hearsay pure and simple-"I killed her; I hit her seven times
with a ball peen hammer"' 4 7-and which under contemporaneous law' was admissible only if uttered within the pendency of the conspiracy in issue. This case involved a murderfor-hire conspiracy in which the murder attempt was unsuccessful, not withstanding the assailant's declaration to the
contrary. In upholding the admissibility of that declaration
143. See, e.g., Del Campo v. Camarillo, 154 Cal. 647, 652-53, 98 P. 1049, 1052-53
(1908); People v. Dilwood, 94 Cal. 89, 91, 29 P. 420, 421 (1892); People v. Irwin, 77 Cal.
494, 504-05, 20 P. 56, 59-60 (1888). See also People v. Opie, 123 Cal. 294, 296, 55 P.
989, 989-90 (1899).
144. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 40 Cal. 2d 483, 489, 254 P.2d 501, 504 (1953);
People v. Gilliland, 39 Cal. App. 2d 250, 256-57, 103 P.2d 179, 182-83 (1940).
145. See text accompanying notes 120-141 supra.
In all fairness, it must be conceded that some such cases contain statements which
surrender the appearance of hearsay only under the most searching scrutiny. See
especially People v. Suter, 43 Cal. App. 2d 444, 454, 111 P.2d 23, 29 (1941).
146. People v. Brown, 131 Cal. App. 2d 643, 656-57, 281 P. 2d 319, 328 (1955).
147. Id. at 651, 281 P.2d at 325.
148. Brown antedated the decision in People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 870-75,
389 P.2d 377, 378-81, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 842-45 (1964), that declarations against penal
interest were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The ruling in Spriggs was
codified as part of the Evidence Code. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (West 1966). Although
it was held in Leach that the declaration against interest exception is inapplicable
insofar as a hearsay statement may incriminate someone other than the declarant, see
People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 438-42, 541 P.2d 296, 308-12, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752, 76468 (1975), the declaration against interest exception as expanded by Spriggs and section 1230 would admit the purely self-incriminatory declaration at issue in Brown.
Although the theory was not broached in Brown, it also is arguable that under the
rather unusual circumstances of that case the declaration in issue was admissible as a
"spontaneous statement" or an "excited utterance." See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240 (West
1966).
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against the objection that the conspiracy had terminated with
the unsuccessful attempt on the victim's life, the court relied
principally on evidence that in the aftermath of that attempt
the conspirators had continued working toward their unattained goal. 4 ' The court went on, in dicta, to cite non-hearsay
"pendency" cum relevancy cases for their holdings that, in
some circumstances, conspiracies may extend in time past the
commission of the contemplated substantive crime."5
In a similar vein, but more dubious in result and reasoning, is another murder-for-hire case,' 5 ' which summarily upheld
the admissibility of a post-murder co-conspirator's declaration.
The court relied exclusively on relevancy cases for the proposition that the conspiracy continued through a meeting of the
conspirators 26 days after the murder, at which property taken
from the decedent's body was distributed. Other cases actually
involving a hearsay declaration by a co-conspirator after the
arguable termination of the conspiracy also have slight precedential value. In some such cases, rulings on pendency were
52
dicta, since the evidentiary error was found nonprejudicial.
In another case, the pendency ruling was altogether unnecessary due to a ground for admissibility independent of the coconspirator exception." 3
IV.

PROPOSED REFORMULATION OF CALIFORNIA LAW IN TERMS OF
THE PURPOSE OF THE HEARSAY RULE AND THE RATIONALE OF
THE CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION

Returning to its earlier overview of the co-conspirator exception in national law, this article will now attempt to assay
55
California law in general, and the Saling54 and Leach' cases
in particular, from the perspective of the two national trends
previously noted.' California's recent codification of the co149. People v. Brown, 131 Cal. App. 2d 643, 656, 281 P.2d 319, 328 (1955).
150. Id. at 656-57, 281 P.2d at 328.
151. People v. Lawrence, 25 Cal. App. 3d 498, 511, 102 Cal. Rptr. 16, 24 (1972).
152. People v. Causey, 220 Cal. App. 2d 641, 663-64, 34 Cal. Rptr. 43, 56 (1963);
see People v. Lichtenstein, 22 Cal. App. 592, 608, 135 P. 692, 699-700 (1913).
153. People v. McFarland, 17 Cal. App. 3d 807, 822, 95 Cal. Rptr. 369, 379-80
(1971). McFarland involved an incriminatory statement which was uttered by a coconspirator within the presence and hearing of the defendant, who remained silent.
The statement was accordingly admissible as an adoptive admission. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1221 (West 1966); see People v. Osuna, 70 Cal. 2d 759, 765, 452 P.2d 678, 681, 76
Cal. Rptr. 462, 465 (1969).
154. People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 500 P.2d 610, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1972).
155. People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 541 P.2d 296, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1975).
156. See text accompanying notes 89-92 supra.
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conspirator exception in Evidence Code section 1223, and the
widespread resort to the exception in modern California
law-indeed in many instances where no hearsay was actually
involved-is testimony to the fact of a felt need in both the
legislative and judicial branches for the exception's lubricative
effect on the prosecution of organized criminal activity. Yet in
codifying the co-conspirator exception, California also codified
an unusually vigorous furtherance requirement. While California's historic commitment to the furtherance requirement'57
has not resulted in confining the application of the coconspirator exception to realistic agency situations, the cases
do reflect the recognition that residual adherence to "agency
rules is better than leaving defendants without protection,
[since] defendants are never in greater danger than when a
superficially clever court sees through the agency rationale and
fails to replace it with anything else."' 58 But as has aptly been
observed, when
agency rules are kept to protect defendants, the strain distorts them. There is pressure to admit all conspirators'
declarations and there is counter-pressure to protect defendants. Since neither of these forces is related to the law of
agency, the cases concerning the co-conspirators' exception are notoriously unsatisfactory.'59
No case could illustrate this proposition better than Saling.
A.

Erroneous Reasoning of Saling

When Saling is measured against the foregoing survey of
California law relating to the pendency, furtherance, and independent evidence requirements of the co-conspirator exception, it is apparent that Saling was consistent with prior law
only insofar as it reaffirmed, at least in its Leach incarnation,
the independent evidence requirement and that requirement's
dual applicability both to the original conspiracy contemplating a particular substantive crime and to any subsidiary conspiracy alleged to have continued after the commission or
60
abandonment of that substantive crime.
There is, however, undeniable inconsistency between the
strict furtherance requirement posited by both precedent and
157.
158.
159.
160.

See text accompanying notes 95-108 supra.
Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, supra note 65, at 1167.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
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statute in California, 6' and Saling's refusal to apply that requirement "mechanically."' ' 2 As Mr. Justice Sullivan's dissent
pointed out, even assuming there was a continuing conspiracy
encompassing the declarant, the co-conspirator's statement
held admissible in Saling was a narrative of past facts which
could hardly have furthered either the fait accompli (the mur63
der) or the promised payment.' Moreover, the statement involved in Saling was made by a declarant who was never shown
to have had any interest in the subsidiary conspiratorial purpose, postulated for pendency purposes, of paying off the other
participants." 4
Declarant Jurgenson's only apparent interest in the satisfaction of his co-conspirators' monetary expectations was his
presumable interest in avoiding apprehension; and that objective was expressly disavowed by Saling as a permissible basis
for deeming a conspiracy to continue past the commission or
abandonment of the contemplated crime.' Since a continuing
or subsidiary conspiracy to avoid apprehension is not judicially
cognizable in California, the only conspiracy which Jurgenson,
as a co-conspirator, could have furthered by his declaration was
the original conspiracy to commit murder. Thus Saling's furtherance holding reduces to the manifestly unsound proposition that a murderer's narration of the facts of his crime to a
161. See text accompanying notes 95-108 supra.
162. People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 852 n.8, 500 P.2d 610, 615 n.8, 103 Cal. Rptr.
698, 703 n.8 (1972).
163. Id. at 858, 500 P.2d at 618-19, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07 (dissenting opinion).
164. Saling specifies that money was "clearly" the motive for the participation
of Saling and Carnes in the conspiracy, 7 Cal. 3d at 852, 500 P.2d at 615, 103 Cal. Rptr.
at 703, but omits any mention of the motive of the declarant, Jurgenson. Thus no
basis was shown for assuming Jurgenson's continued participation in the conspiracy
to commit murder insofar as that conspiracy was deemed to embrace Saling and
Carnes' efforts to obtain payment from Murphy. Yet Evidence Code section 1223, see
note 9 supra, expressly limits the co-conspirator exception to declarations "made by
the declarant while participatingin a conspiracy .. "(Emphasis added). By stressing that the witness Carnes as well as the defendant Saling had at the time of Jurgenson's declaration, an unfulfilled conspiratorial objective of receiving payment for the
murder, while omitting any mention of the declarant Jurgenson's having shared this
subsidiary conspiracy to achieve it, Saling seemingly turned the co-conspirator exception on its head. The co-conspirator exception derives its name from the fact that the
extrajudicial declarant, not the witness who testifies in court to the fact of the declaration, must be shown to have been the co-conspirator of the defendant at the time of
the declaration. Jurgenson could be deemed a part of the continuing Saling only if
remuneration were to be presumed to be the motive of any conspirator who has no
other apparent reason for participating in a conspiracy.
165. People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 853, 500 P.2d 610, 616, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698,
704 (1972), adopting the holding of Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.440 (1949).
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co-conspirator in that murder furthers the purpose of their conspiracy to commit the already committed murder.
It must respectfully be asserted in all candor that it was a
non sequitur non pareil to declare in Saling that
Jurgenson's statements to Carnes were clearly made in
furtherance of the conspiracy to kill Catherine Murphy, as
it was necessary that Carnes be made aware of the departure from the original scheme in order that he, in the best
interests of himself and his co-conspirators, be able to
maintain the integrity of their security until they received
6
payment for their participation in the crime. '
The furtherance infirmities of Saling, since they stem in
part from Jurgenson's status in the ostensibly continuing conspiracy, are suggestive of the even more fundamental pendency
problems posed by Saling's concept of a murder conspiracy
continuing until payment for the murder has been effected in
accordance with the expectations of some of the conspirators.
It is necessary to look beyond the four corners of the cases cited
in Saling to appreciate the full complexity of the question of
when a conspiracy has terminated for purposes of the coconspirator exception.
67
As has been demonstrated,' there was little controlling
precedent to enlighten the court in Saling as to the circumstances under which a conspiracy may be deemed, for evidentiary
purposes, to have continued past the commission of its sole
contemplated substantive crime. Nevertheless, most of the
applicable authority, although old, was entirely unsympathetic
to attempts to satisfy the pendency requirement with real and
imagined objectives or motives secondary to the commission of
the substantive crime contemplated by the conspiracy. This
line of cases was ignored in Saling and reliance was placed
instead on spurious precedent: cases dealing not with the coconspirator exception but rather with the relevancy of nonhearsay evidence. Citing People v. Collier' and People v.
Lorraine,' Saling held that since the defendant had been
166. Id. at 852 n.8, 500 P.2d at 615 n.8, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 203 n.8.
167. See text accompanying notes 142-53 supra.
168. 111 Cal. App. 215, 237, 295 P. 898, 906 (1931).
169. 90 Cal. App. 317, 327, 265 P. 893, 897 (1928). Curiously enough, Collier and
Lorraine are the only two cases of their type to evidence some recognition, in portions
not cited by Saling, that the relevancy of co-conspirators' acts as evidence of a conspiracy is a question independent of the probative status of either the hearsay declarations
or the substantive criminal acts of co-conspirators. See note 120 supra.
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"motivated" by promised payment to join the murder conspiracy, the receipt of that money was one of the "main objectives"
of the conspiracy insofar as the defendant was concerned.' 7 By
the terms of Saling, until this personal "main objective" of the
defendant was fulfilled, all his co-conspirators in the murder
remained his co-conspirators for evidentiary purposes, regardless of whether they shared the defendant's continuing personal
objective or played any conscious role in achieving it. Thus a
declaration made after a murder by a participant in the murder
was deemed admissible against the defendant at his trial for
that murder.
In light of the analysis presented herein, it is submitted
that Saling's interpretation and application of the pendency
requirement eviscerated an important limitation on the coconspirator exception and permitted that exception to be invoked in far too sweeping a fashion. The holding in Saling is
inconsistent with the traditional and wholly legitimate concern
of the hearsay rule, as construed and implemented by both the
decisional and statutory law of California, that evidence not
subject to cross-examination and other in-court assurances of
reliability be excluded altogether, absent some circumstantial
guarantee of trustworthiness. The gloss placed on Saling by
Leach, while it limits the value of Saling as precedent by stressing the independent evidence requirement, fails to repudiate
Saling's fundamentally flawed premise: that statements by
conspirators made after the accomplishment or abandonment
of a conspiracy's substantive criminal objective are sufficiently
trustworthy to warrant evidence of such statements being admitted in derogation of the hearsay rule. The California Supreme Court should "drop the other shoe." Saling should be
pro tanto overruled.
B.

Rationale for Future Application of the Co-Conspirator
Exception

The overruling of Saling would acknowledge both the need
for due limitation of the co-conspirator exception and the intent of the legislature to provide that limitation. But the California Supreme Court need not pretend that the exception can
ever be persuasively justified on the theory'that agency relationships among co-conspirators will assure the impeachment
170. People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 852, 500 P.2d 610, 615, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698,
703 (1972).
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of any unreliable hearsay evidence admitted. The most defensible rationale for the exception is simply its sheer necessity
in view of the difficulty of proving conspiratorial crimes. " The
interest of society in successfully prosecuting conspiracies
has, in the legislature's judgment, warranted relaxing in some
instances the normal standards of evidence so as to shift from
judges to juries the primary responsibility for determining the
reliability of hearsay evidence of conspiratorial crime. General
legal principles give way to the jury's common sense and collective conscience in the determination of particular factual
issues. Thus when hearsay evidence is admitted under the coconspirator exception, its reliability is ultimately determined
as part of the jury's resolution of whether, at the close of all the
evidence, there remains a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's
guilt. This legislative policy judgment can hardly be deemed
capricious in view of the similar balancing of values implicit in
countless judicial invocations of the co-conspirator exception
under the common law of evidence.
C. Requirements for FutureApplication of Co-Conspirator
Exception
Recognition of the necessity rationale for the coconspirator exception does not, however, mandate abandonment of the agency-related requirements of independent evidence, furtherance, and pendency. These requirements do
serve the protective function of ensuring that grossly unreliable
evidence will be excluded from admission notwithstanding the
co-conspirator exception. From their incorporation into Evidence Code section 1223, it is manifest that the continued prophylactic effect of these safeguards was an essential element of
the legislature's adoption of the exception. Although they have
evolved into lenient forms rendering admissible the statements
of co-conspirators who are not agents of the defendant in any
civil sense, when these requirements are met there remains a
fair chance that the defendant will be in a position to counter
the prejudicial effect of a hearsay declaration admitted to
prove the truth of what is in fact a false assertion.
The Single Common Object Concept
As both Saling and its antecedent cases demonstrate, the
171.

See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
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pendency requirement has been much less fixed in form and
meaning than the relatively strict independent evidence and
furtherance requirements applied under California law to limit
the scope of the co-conspirator exception.' 72 If consideration is
extended to cases purporting to deal with pendency regardless
of the technically controlling nature of the resulting holdings,
precedent provides a decidedly mixed bag of situations held to
constitute continuing conspiracies.' The confusion surrounding the pendency requirement may best be dispelled by California courts focusing their attention in future cases on what is not
only the key analytic concept in the demarcation of the pendency of a conspiracy for evidentiary purposes, but also the
most important element in the interrelationship between pendency and the other requirements of furtherance and independent evidence: identification of the "object" of a conspiracy.
"Object" is used here in the specialized sense of the act which
the conspirators have joined together to accomplish. The crucial concept in analyzing the pendency status of a conspiracy
is that each conspiracy should, for purposes of applying the coconspirator exception,'7 4 be viewed as having just one object
172. Compare text accompanying notes 93-108 supra with text accompanying
note 109-53 supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 134-41 supra.
174. It should be stressed that the idea of a single common object as here presented is attuned solely to the purpose of sound circumscription of the co-conspirator
exception, and may be so applied without affecting existing rules of substantive liability for the acts of co-conspirators. The determination of the pendency of a conspiracy
for evidentiary purposes need not necessarily control the determination of the pendency of that conspiracy for purposes of imposing on the conspirators substantive
liability for the acts of their co-conspirators, nor does the single object concept for
evidentiary pendency require alteration of the settled rule that only a single substantive charge of criminal conspiracy lies against a member of a conspiracy having multiple objects. See, e.g., People v. Kobey, 105 Cal. App. 2d 548, 564, 234 P.2d 251, 260
(1951). Furthermore, authoritative adoption of the suggested rule that subsequent
conspiracies by co-conspirators do not, for purposes of the co-conspirator exception,
extend the pendency of the original conspiracy would leave open the perplexing question whether the substantive vicarious liability of a conspirator for the acts of his coconspirators extends not only to whatever subsidiary substantive crimes those conspirators may actually commit, but also to the co-conspirators' crime of subsidiarily conspiring among themselves to commit such substantive crimes.
Although separable problems of pendency are posed by the substantive and the
evidentiary law of conspiracy, there is currently pending before the Supreme Court of
California a conspiracy case presenting a pendency question that falls neatly in the
crack between substantive liability and evidentiary procedure. People v. Saling, Crim.
No. 18869 (hearing granted July 23, 1975), involves the issue of when a conspiracy is
to be deemed terminated for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations
pertaining to prosecution for that conspiracy. See People v. Saling, 48 Cal. App. 3d
724, 735-41, 122 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7-12 (1975) (advance sheets), vacated and hearing
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shared in common by all those party to that conspiracy. The
success of the conspirators in achieving this object, or their
abandonment of their efforts to that end, should be determinative of the pendency of a conspiracy.
The "single common object" proposal is not meant to deny
that there are many conspiracies which have in fact multiple
common objects. Conspirators do frequently conspire simultaneously to commit several different crimes, or agree anew to
commit additional crimes in the course of effectuating their
original conspiracy.'75 But there is nothing gained and much
confusion engendered by evidentiarily treating such circumstances as constituting a single conspiracy to commit multiple
crimes or otherwise having multiple objectives. If all the conspirators share the several objectives, breaking down their joint
efforts into separate but simultaneous or contemporaneous
conspiracies has no effect on the applicability of the coconspirator exception as to any statement by any conspirator
during the life of any of the conspiracies. The importance of
segregating into separate conspiracies the efforts of conspirators towards separate objects lies in the fact that it would prevent use of the co-conspirator exception as to a defendant who
granted, Crim. No. 18869, Cal. Sup. Ct., July 23, 1975. The supreme court's press
release referred to this as involving, inter alia, "a question as to the duration of a
conspiracy which is similar to that already before the Court in People v. Leach [15
Cal. 3d 419, 541 P.2d 296, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1975)]." See Summary of Cases Accepted by Supreme Court, Week of July 21, 1975, 22 Cal. Official Rep. Advance Sheets
(Aug. 12, 1975).
The traditional rationale for statutes of limitation is that they reduce the possibility of erroneous judgments premised upon state and consequently unreliable evidence.
See, e.g., Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-61 (1970); cf. Elkins v. Derby,
12 Cal. 3d 410, 412, 525 P.2d 81, 82, 115 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1974). Thus it would seem
that the evidentiary concepts regarding the pendency of conspiracies developed at
length in this article would be of considerable relevance to the pending Saling case.
That case, incidentally, involves a different defendant, and bears no direct relation to
People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 500 P.2d 610, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1972). Plus qa change,
plus c'est la mrme chose.
175. One paragraph of Penal Code section 182's punishment provisions recognizes the possibility of a conspiracy with multiple objects: "If the felony is conspiracy
to commit two or more felonies which have different punishments and the commission
of such felonies constitute but one offense of conspiracy, the penalty shall be that
prescribed for the felony which has the greater maximum term." CAL. PEN. CODE § 182
(West 1970). Otherwise, however, section 182 refers exclusively to conspiracies having
but a single object. Moreover, both the overt act provision, id., and the co-conspirator
exception itself, CAL. EvID. CODE § 1223(a) (West 1966), use the definite rather than
the indefinite article in referring respectively to "some act ... to effect the object [of
a conspiracy]" and a "statement . . . in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy." (Emphasis added).
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was not involved in the formulation and pursuit of a particular
objective. In such a case, the pendency requirement would
make the co-conspirator exception inapplicable to any declarations by co-conspirators after the single common object of the
conspiracy had been attained or abandoned.
Whether an object is in fact shared by all the conspirators
allegedly party to a particular conspiracy should be ascertained
by what is literally an objective rather than a subjective standard. The single common object of a conspiracy is the act
which all the parties thereto are seeking jointly to accomplish.
Particularly relevant to this concept of unanimity of objective
is the distinction drawn by the dissent in Saling between the
object of a conspiracy and the motives of the conspirators.'
The object of a conspiracy is what the conspirators have agreed
to try to accomplish; why each conspirator has felt impelled to
join the conspiracy is a different matter not pertinent to the
pendency of the conspiracy. It needs little elaboration to demonstrate the problems which would abound were the pendency
of conspiracies to be controlled by whether individual conspirators had abandoned or were continuing to pursue their
underlying motives, especially since the motives might well
reduce to impulsions incapable of complete satiation: greed,
lust, rascism, or the placation of any number of other psychological bedevilments. To the extent that some of those party to
a conspiracy may jointly see the object of that conspiracy as
merely a means of achieving some other tangible objective, the
single common object concept allows the pendency of the separate conspiracy, with its collateral objective and limited membership, to be determined in the proper context of that separate
conspiracy alone.
The cogency of the single common object concept stems
from the attention it focuses on the interrelationship between
the pendency requirement and the independent evidence and
furtherance requirements. It must be remembered that it is the
rare case in which a defendant has already been convicted of
having participated in a conspiracy with the declarant whose
hearsay statements are sought to be used against the defendant. Generally the existence of a conspiratorial relationship
between defendant and declarant is hotly disputed, and is the
major issue upon which the defendant's guilt or innocence
176. People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 857, 500 P.2d 610, 618, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698,
706 (1972) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).

19751

THE CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION

turns; often the defendant denies ever having been associated
with the declarant in any manner whatsoever. The state must
tip this balance of accusation and denial in its favor before it
may avail itself of hearsay evidence: it must go beyond mere
allegation of the defendant's role in a conspiracy to establish
prima facie by independent evidence that the defendant did in
fact participate in a conspiracy with the declarant. Only then
is the state entitled to use hearsay evidence in seeking to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt what it had previously established
prima facie through non-hearsay evidence.
As previously indicated,'7 7 the requirement of prima facie
proof of a conspiracy between the defendant and the declarant,
together with the other agency-related requirements of pendency and furtherance, does not render the "agency rationale"
adequate to account for the co-conspirator exception. The exception finds its only tenable justification in the need for evidentiary accomodation of the prosecution of conspiracies.
What the requirement of an independently established, prima
facie relationship between the defendant and the declarant
does assure, regardless of whether that relationship is ultimately determined to have been conspiratorial, is a rational
probability that the defendant will be able to indentify and
expose any inaccuracies in the hearsay, notwithstanding the
unavailability of the declarant for cross-examination. This
probability is enhanced by limiting the hearsay which can be
admitted in light of the prima facie relationship between defendant and declarant to statements in furtherance and within the
pendency of that relationship.
It is inevitable that restrictions like pendency and furtherance may in some circumstances appear to be arbitrarily applied. When a relationship is such that a defendant is deemed
able to explain a declarant's statement on one subject, it is
difficult to conceive of that ability to explain evaporating when
the same declarant contemporaneously addresses another subject not in furtherance of his relationship with the defendant.
The problem of apparent arbitrariness is even more acute when
the limitation is based on chronology rather than subject matter. Especially when drawing lines in terms of time, the law can
never persuasively justify the resulting differences in treatment
of conduct just instants apart, and must content itself by mak177.

See text accompanying note 171 supra.
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ing the line definite and easily perceived. Where a prima facie
conspiratorial relationship between the defendant and the declarant has been shown, it could hardly be argued in support
of the pendency limitation that the defendant's ability to explain his co-conspirator's declarations changes radically at the
moment pendency lapses. But the pendency requirement recognizes that this ability does attenuate over time; for lack of a
more flexible yet feasible alternative, this consideration dictates a cut-off point at which the applicability of the coconspirator exception ceases absolutely.'
This article's survey of the relevant cases indicates that
the arbitrariness inherent in application of the furtherance and
pendency requirements is only compounded by resort to expansive notions of continuing conspiracies with so many objects
that virtually any statement by a co-conspirator may be found
to be within the pendency of the conspiracy and in furtherance
of some one of its objects. The single common object concept
is proposed as an antidote to this tendency, which subverts the
legislature's sound intention that the co-conspirator exception
be justly limited in application. In order to be in furtherance
of a conspiracy, a declaration ought to further what has been
established prima facie, by independent evidence, to have
been the single common object of that conspiracy. In order to
be within the pendency of a conspiracy, a declaration ought to
have been made before the conspiracy's single common ob178. A court confronted with the vagaries of the co-conspirator exception can
take comfort in the pithy observation of one of the most eminent justices of this
nation's highest court on the necessity and perplexities of legal line-drawing:
In our approach towards exactness we constantly tend to work out definite lines or equators to mark distinctions which we first notice as a
difference of poles. It is evident in the beginning that there must be
differences in the legal position of infants and adults. In the end we
establish twenty-one as the dividing point. There is a difference manifest
at the outset between night and day. The statutes of Massachusetts fix
the dividing points at one hour after sunset and one hour before sunrise,
ascertained according to mean time. When he has discovered that a difference is a difference of degree, that distinguished extremes have between them a penumbra in which one gradually shades into the other, a
tyro thinks to puzzle you by asking where you are going to draw the line,
and an advocate of more experience will show the arbitrariness of the line
proposed by putting cases very near to it on one side or the other. But
the theory of the law is that such lines exist, because the theory of the
law as to any possible conduct is that it is either lawful or unlawful. As
that difference has no gradation about it, when applied to shades of
conduct that are very near each other it has an arbitrary look.
O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 23233 (1920).
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ject, as established prima facie by independent evidence, has
been attained or abandoned.
Restriction of the Co-Conspirator Exception to Criminal
Conspiracies
The final condition proposed by this author for application
of the co-conspirator exception is a rule which may be viewed
functionally either as a further procedural refinement of the
pendency requirement-requiring the single common object
determinative of pendency to be an unlawful object-or as an
altogether new requirement added to the three traditional
requirements of furtherance, pendency, and independent evidence. The co-conspirator exception should be applied only to
7
the declarations of co-conspirators in criminal conspiracies. ,
179. As defined by the Penal Code, a criminal conspiracy must have as its object
a crime or other specified quasi-criminal act. Thus, CAL. PEN. CODE § 182 (West 1970)
provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire:
1. To commit any crime.
2. Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any crime, or to procure
another to be charged or arrested for any crime.
3. Falsely to move or maintain any suit, action or proceeding.
4. To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by any means
which are in themselves criminal, or to obtain money or property by false
pretenses or by false promises with fraudulent intent not to perform such
promises.
5. To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals,
or to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws.
6. To commit any crime against the person of the President or Vice
President of the United States, the governor of any state or territory, any
United States justice or judge, or the secretary of any of the executive
departments of the United States.
They are punishable as follows: ....
CAL. PEN. CODE § 183 (West 1970) further provides: "No conspiracies, other than those
enumerated in the preceding section, are punishable criminally."
It has thus become well established under California law that "the object of [a
criminal] conspiracy must be an unlawful act." 1 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 114,
at 108 (1963) (emphasis in original). While unlawful acts are not necessarily criminal,
cf. Developments, supra note 52, at 940-42, the vague language of section 182 relating
to acts other than crimes which may be the object of criminal conspiracies has been
narrowly construed, generally by reference to the criminal law. See, e.g., Lorenson v.
Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 49, 59-60, 216 P.2d 859, 865-66 (1950); Davis v. Superior
Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 14-16, 345 P.2d 513, 518-19 (1959).
Although the phrase [in section 182] referring to an act injurious to
public health or morals has occasionally been cited as the basis of a
conviction, it is doubtful whether it serves any significant purpose. The
object of the conspiracy will almost invariably be within the terms of
some specific criminal statute, and therefore can be charged under the
more inclusive provision on conspiracy to commit "any crime."
1 B. WITKIN, supra § 116, at 110. Evidence Code section 1223, in referring to "a
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This is the only way to implement the co-conspirator exception
consistently with the intent of the legislature. In view of the
social dangers posed by organized crime, the legislature, following a well-trodden judicial path, has seen fit to relax the hearsay rule in criminal conspiracy prosecutions. In construing the
requirements upon which this relaxation of the hearsay rule is
conditioned, the very purpose for that relaxation ought not to
be ignored.
The concept of civil conspiracy serves an entirely different
function from that of criminal conspiracy. Civil conspiracy is
merely a substantive device for imposing vicarious liability for
civil wrongs actually suffered. It is well settled in civil conspiracy law that no cause of action lies for civil conspiracy per se;
to be the basis for recovery, a civil conspiracy must actually
result in some damage legally actionable independently of the
conspiracy. 180 The concept of civil conspiracy increases the
probability of a victim of civil wrong actually recovering damages to recompense him for the harm caused, by increasing the
number of persons who may be held liable for the harm. Thus
the concept of civil conspiracy promotes the important social
policy of providing fair, orderly, and efficacious procedures for
the settlement of grievances. While this policy may be the hallmark of civilization, it is quite different from the value judgments underlying the law of criminal conspiracy and the coconspirator exception.
Accordingly, there seems to be no reason why a civil conspiracy should operate to invoke the co-conspirator exception.
Certainly there is no legislative policy of enhancing the probability of successful recovery for a tort by allowing the fact that
a tort has occurred to be established through hearsay evidence,
even when the tort may have been the result of a civil conspiracy. If the civil conspiracy has the substance and cohesion of
an actual civil agency, Evidence Code section 12221s' provides
conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong," see note 9 supra, should be deemed no
broader in scope than Penal Code section 182's definition of a criminal conspiracy as
a conspiracy having as its object either "any crime" or the acts thereafter specified.
180. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305,
315-17, 444 P.2d 481, 488, 70 Cal. Rptr. 849, 856 (1968).
181. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1222 (West 1966) provides:
Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule if:
(a) The statement was made by a person authorized by the party
to make a statement or statements for him concerning the subject matter
of the statement; and
(b) The evidence is offered either after admission of evidence suffi-
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for the introduction of adoptive admissions. There is no need
to resort to the co-conspirator exception, with its fictional gloss
on the civil law of agency-a gloss tolerated only because of the
greater danger entailed in allowing the full rigor of the hearsay
rule to extend a significant measure of immunity to criminal
conspirators.
Constitutional Considerations
The proposed orientation of the pendency requirement
towards the single common object of a criminal conspiracy
completes this article's suggested reformulation of the coconspirator exception under California law. This reformulation
has been framed as a counterpoint to an analysis of the exception as applied in American law generally. That analysis of
national law concluded with the identification of two modem
trends. One of those trends, the recognition of the necessity
rationale for the exception, has already figured prominently in
the foregoing reformulation of California law. It remains only
to comment briefly on the second such trend, the recognition
of the constitutional need for the minimal reliability of evi82
dence admitted under exceptions to the hearsay rule.'
It cannot be said that evidence admitted under the coconspirator exception in accordance with this article would in
no event raise confrontation clause problems. But it is certain
that the future application of the protective quasi-agency requirements of independent evidence, furtherance, and pendency in accordance with the principles set forth herein would
greatly reduce the probability of convictions being secured
upon unreliable evidence.' The touchstone for administration

D.

cient to sustain a finding of such authority or, in the court's discretion
as to the order of proof, subject to the admission of such evidence.
182. See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
183. The focus of contemporary confrontation law has shifted from examination
of the possible equivalency of the hearsay rule and the Federal Constitution's confrontation clause, to case-by-case determination of the constitutional reliability of evidence
otherwise admissible under exceptions to the hearsay rule. See generally Dutton v.
Evan, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the CoConspiratorException, supra note 58; Garland & Snow, The Co-ConspiratorsException to the Hearsay Rule, supra note 59, at 14-22; Note, Preserving the Right to
Confrontation,supra note 64, at 756. Thus satisfaction of the standards set forth herein
for the application of the co-conspirator exception cannot guarantee that a particular
hearsay declaration will pass constitutional muster. The burden of detecting evidence
which technically complies with an exception to the hearsay rule but nevertheless
seems circumstantially to bear a high probability of being inaccurate falls in the first
instance on the trial courts. Besides the solemn duty of enforcing the procedural
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of the co-conspirator exception in California courts should be
the defendant's apparent ability to assess and challenge, without the benefit of confronting the declarant, the trustworthiness of a purported co-conspirator's hearsay declaration. If this
fundamental precept is fully understood and faithfully implemented by the trial courts, with due regard for the demonstrated danger of confusing the policies underlying the substantive law of conspiracy with the policies permitting the admission in certain circumstances of hearsay evidence in criminal
prosecutions, California's obligation to afford defendants due
process of law will be as well met in conspiracy cases as in
others.
guarantee of the state and federal constitutions, the trial courts are charged with a
more basic discretion to promote the administration of justice by excluding evidence
with a high potential for prejudice. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966); cf. People v.
Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 451-54, 492 P.2d 1, 7-9, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319-21 (1972). This
discretion should be exercised to exclude unreliable hearsay evidence notwithstanding
the admissibility of such evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule. Cf. note 126
supra.
It hardly bears noting that the converse is not the case. The legislature has not
authorized the courts to admit seemingly reliable evidence notwithstanding its inadmissibility under the hearsay rule. Nor would it be particularly desirable, were the
courts possessed of the legislature's power to repeal the hearsay rule, to institute
instead a system of case-by-case judicial determination of the reliability of proffered
evidence. Even if only the minimal reliability required by the confrontation clause
were the test under such a particularistic system, a period of standardless confusion
and conflicting rulings by trial courts would probably be followed by the gradual
development upon appeal of rules of admissibility even more amorphous than those
now prevailing under the hearsay rule and its exceptions. Cf. Reynolds v. Superior
Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 845 n.16, 528 P.2d 45, 52 n.16, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 444 n.16 (1974).
A concomitant burden would be imposed on the appellate courts, which would have
to accord less deference to trial court evaluations of reliability than to other exercises
of "sound discretion." See Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the CoConspirator Exception, supra note 58, at 1381; Note, Preserving the Right to
Confrontation, supra note 64, at 756. The likely result can be judged by reference to
the complex fabric of analogous judge-made law concerning the admissibility of confessions. See, e.g., People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 436-39, 369 P.2d 714, 725-27, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 165, 174-76 (1962); People v. Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d 160, 169-7.0, 346 P.2d 764, 76869 (1959). Offers of proof of hearsay generally are far more frequent at trial than
attempts to introduce confessions, and the law governing the admissibility of confessions has had a long time to evolve. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 817-20, at 291-308
(Chadbourne rev. 1970). It thus seems indisputable that the appellate chore of supervising a system of case-by-case determination of the circumstantial reliability of hearsay evidence would be monumental. The sound administration of justice is likely to
be far better served by retaining the initial filter of the hearsay rule and confining
particularistic review of the reliability of proffered evidence to such constitutionally
suspect evidence as passes through that filter.

